Another response from the original thread, made just now and which I'm moving here:
From Magister Musicae:
Rich has hit the nail on the head with the problems with Mr Coulombe's article.
While there's a great deal one could take issue with, the oversimplification seems highly pronounced here:
Plato's student Aristotle, however, was a materialist --- he believed that matter was self-existent, with neither beginning nor end, and that there is no personal God. For him, although the Universals are real in a sense, they derive their reality from the sum total of their physical manifestations. In other words, where Plato would teach that horses are horses because they reflect "Horse," Aristotle held that "Horse" is "Horse" because it reflects horses. The distinction (and the very ideas discussed!) may seem terribly abstract, but as we shall see, they have had frightfully concrete results.
The moderate realist, following Aristotle doesn't assert that a "Horse" is a "Horse" by reflecting horses, at all.
The moderate realist says that any particular horse participates in that nature "Horse". That is, each horse is matter united to the form of a horse, which itself then participates in the Horse nature which is the universal.
We do not know what constitutes "Horseness" (Adam probably did, since he names the animals, and names in Scriptural terminology means denoting the nature of a thing), we can see the accidents of the particulars which can give us insight into how to distinguish between a "horse" and a "donkey", for instance. Since we do not know the specific difference between the nature of "horse" and "donkey" we must distinguish by noting these accidental differences.
This oversimplication of Mr. Coulombe makes it seem as if moderate realism asserts a universal is not real but virtual (not real, but based on some distinction in reality). That is most assuredly false, and really is more descriptive of a type of Nominalism, not of Moderate Realism.
That mischaracterization sets up a straw man, and a great deal of his latter arguments are flawed because they argue against this straw man, not against Moderate Realism.
That was edited to include the following ... I pressed "Post" not Preview before I was done ...
Also note his comments on the Fall of Man. He oversimplifies again, and when doing so his simplistic argument gains a fourth term. He starts talking of the "Fall" but then writes of the transmission of Original Sin. These are two separate concepts. Odo of Tournai tries to unite them, but the quote presents greater theological problems that Mr Columbe neglects to mention. If the Fall changes the "substance" of men from (Unfallen man) into a new substance (Fallen man), then the nature has changed. The only link between these natures is nominal. Adam before the fall is not Adam after the fall. This leads to Lutheranism -- that man's nature is entirely corrupted, not just wounded. Coulombe tries to explain Baptism by suggesting a similar transition, but that's even worse, and again there is now only a nominal link between the two, because then we have a problem explaining actual sin. Do actual sins remove a man from this "Redeemed man" nature to a "Damned man" state. If so how is this restored? Are we then suggesting that Sacraments cause substantial changes? This naturally leads to Calvinism, if taken to one of its logical ends.
The Thomistic doctrine on the Fall is complex, and there are some unsatistisfying explanations, but quoting one Jesuit who has difficulty as a condemnation of the Thomistic doctrine is hardly useful. There's a great divide between Thomistic Jesuits and Dominicans, for instance, and I too would say that the Jesuit notions that flow from some Suarezian and Molinist mistakes (possibly errors), do make these matters not "clear".
For the Thomist, the nature of man is not changed by the Fall, but the gifts given to that nature were removed. It is not in man's nature to have Sanctifying Grace, Immortality or Impassibility, so when those accidental additions were removed as a result of the Fall, man was back to only what his nature provided. The fall was an act against the order of that nature, so disturbed the nature, wounded it. It is still the same nature, but wounded, infirmed. It still functions, but not as properly as it should. The only problem comes in how it is passed from generation to generation, which St. Thomas will argue has something to do with the generative act. This is where the doctrine becomes very complicated and really hasn't been fleshed out, still, it's not incomprehensible, and the alternative that Mr Coulombe suggests is not easier or better, but leads to much worse.