Can we extricate ourselves from Molinism?
(08-22-2011, 12:20 AM)Vetus Ordo Wrote:
(08-21-2011, 11:21 PM)INPEFESS Wrote:
(08-21-2011, 09:19 PM)Gregory I Wrote: I know one: That God is the Cause of the commission of evil acts, but not their formal malice. SInce he has created all things with their end in view, he has therefore brought into being the evil acts that men commit (By willing to create men he knew would do them).

Is not GOd therefore the author of humankinds evil actions, since they would not be commited unless he had willed to create those who would do such things?

Yes, this is (more or less) the third ojection leveled against the Thomistic system in the Catholic Encyclopedia's article called "Controversies on Grace".

I would like it to be known that I identify most with the Thomistic perspective on grace, but I do think that these objections need to be answerable in order for Thomism to be a potential solution to the problem (as it were).

Why is this an "unanswerable" objection?

I don't recall saying that it is "unanswerable". I said that these objections (in general, not necessarily this one specifically) need to be answered. I am simply asking for the answer.

Quote:Ne nos inducas in tentationem: the Our Father himself hints at God's sovereignty over all created things.

Of course. But I think the point is that, if God so chooses to abandon you to temptation, then that prayer (or any prayer) is worthless because His will does not choose you to be a recipient of Final Perseverence.

Quote:Molinism on the other hand makes God a passive being, something literally blasphemous.

Well, yes . . . that seems to be logical conclusion of it.
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(08-22-2011, 01:26 AM)Vetus Ordo Wrote: Why would these things conflict with my views? They don't.

Doesn't molinism just teach that God predestines man to make the choices necessary for salvation?
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(08-22-2011, 01:32 AM)Norbert Wrote:
(08-22-2011, 01:26 AM)Vetus Ordo Wrote: Why would these things conflict with my views? They don't.

Doesn't molinism just teach that God predestines man to make the choices necessary for salvation?

Not really.

You should read more about it.
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(08-22-2011, 01:32 AM)Vetus Ordo Wrote:
(08-22-2011, 01:32 AM)Norbert Wrote:
(08-22-2011, 01:26 AM)Vetus Ordo Wrote: Why would these things conflict with my views? They don't.

Doesn't molinism just teach that God predestines man to make the choices necessary for salvation?

Not really.

You should read more about it.

Honestly...will do.  this thread has mostly made me more confused rather than less.
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Here is what I expect will be some of the responses to these objections from those who defend the Thomist system:
Catholic Encyclopedia: Controversies on Grace, Thomism Wrote:The first objection is the danger that in the Thomistic system the freedom of the will cannot be maintained as against efficacious grace, a difficulty which by the way is not unperceived by the Thomists themselves. For since the essence of freedom does not lie in the contingency of the act nor in the merely passive indifference of the will, but rather in its active indifference — to will or not to will, to will this and not that — so it appears impossible to reconcile the physical predetermination of a particular act by an alien will and the active spontaneousness of the determination by the will itself; nay more, they seem to exclude each other as utterly as do determinism and indeterminism, necessity and freedom. The Thomists answer this objection by making a distinction between sensus compositus and sensus divisus, but the Molinists insist that this distinction is not correctly applicable here. For just as a man who is bound to a chair cannot be said to be sitting freely as long as his ability to stand is thwarted by indissoluble cords, so the will predetermined by efficacious grace to a certain thing cannot be said to retain the power to dissent, especially since the will, predetermined to this or that act, has not the option to receive or disregard the premotion, since this depends simply and solely on the will of God. And does not the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, cap. v, can. iv) describe efficacious grace as a grace which man "can reject", and from which he "can dissent"? Consequently, the very same grace, which de facto is efficacious, might under other circumstances be inefficacious.

This objection might be considered a strawman argument, because from the chair analogy in the explication of Thomism from the same article, the man is not bound to the chair; rather, he freely sits. It is as though he has been walking for many days and God places a chair before him. The sight of the chair is delightful and God removes any reason that would cause his will to choose to remain standing, so the man freely chooses to sit. However, he nevertheless retains the capacity to remain standing. 

Session VI, Can. IV from the Council of Trent says that man “can dissent”—that is, they retain the capacity to resist. However, God reveals His goodness through His grace in such a way that man has no cause to resist it. So he can resist, but he won’t.

Catholic Encyclopedia: Controversies on Grace, Thomism Wrote:Herein the second objection to the Thomistic distinction between gratia efficax and gratia sufficiens is already indicated. If both graces are in their nature and intrinsically different, it is difficult to see how a grace can be really sufficient which requires another grace to complete it. Hence, it would appear that the Thomistic gratia sufficiens is in reality a gratia insufficiens. The Thomists cannot well refer the inefficacy of this grace to the resistance of the free will, for this act of resistance must be traced to a proemotio physica as inevitable as the efficacious grace.

I am not sure how the Thomist responds to this one, expect perhaps that sufficient grace is sufficient for efficacious grace, not sufficient for the good action itself.
Catholic Encyclopedia: Controversies on Grace, Thomism Wrote:Moreover, a third great difficulty lies in the fact that sin, as an act, demands the predetermining activity of the "first mover", so that God would according to this system appear to be the originator of sinful acts. The Thomistic distinction between the entity of sin and its malice offers no solution of the difficulty. For since the Divine influence itself, which premoves ad unum, both introduces physically the sin as an act and entity, and also, by the simultaneous withholding of the opposite premotion to a good act, makes the sin itself an inescapable fatality, it is not easy to explain why sin cannot be traced back to God as the originator. Furthermore, most sinners commit their misdeeds, not with a regard to the depravity, but for the sake of the physical entity of the acts, so that ethics must, together with the wickedness, condemn the physical entity of sin. The Molinists deny that this objection affects their own system, when they postulate the concursus of God in the sinful act, and help themselves out of the dilemma by drawing the distinction between the entity and malice of sin. They say that the Divine co-operation is a concursus simultaneus, which employs the co-operating arm of God only after the will by its own free determination has decided upon the commission of the sinful act, whereas the Thomistic co-operation is essentially a concursus proevius which as an inevitable physical premotion predetermines the act regardless of the fact whether the human will can resist or not.

I am not sure about this one. I expect the Thomist would respond that God is not the author of evil acts, but we are; God merely passively wills them. In this way, it is like a set of two gears, the independent gear being the performance of a good or bad action and the dependent gear being the will of man. When a good action is ordained by the will of God, God’s will actively moves forward causing the dependent gear to deny itself its own forward motion and give itself over to the movement of God, thus moving it backward. But the independent gear does not turn unless the dependent gear co-operates. To avoid the difficulty of the dependent gear thwarting the forward motion of the independent gear, God so entices the will of the dependent gear to “relax” (as it were) and allow the independent gear to move it without resistance.  However, when the greater glory of God is brought about by the reciprocal effect of an evil action, God does not actively will the evil action; rather, he passively permits it on the condition that it will profit His greater glory in response to it. In this way, the independent gear “wills” to allow itself to be turned backward by the dependent gear, which is given a free choice to move forward or backward (forward=selfish action / backward=selfless action). God’s omnipotence ordains that a bad action chosen at such and such a time will bring about His greater glory, but He does not actively will the evil action; nor does He author the bad action. Instead, He offers the choice to the dependent gear and provides it with sufficient grace while temporarily withholding efficacious grace. Provided that the dependent gear is not going to respond to the sufficient grace, God’s knowledge (which is a consequence of His omnipotence) of this future resistance means that he does not provide it with efficacious grace (to coerce it to conformity), at which time He actively wills to passively allow the dependent gear to move itself forward, which turns the independent gear backward. Thus, the bad action is permitted in accordance with God as the First Mover, but only insomuch as it is activated by us. 
Catholic Encyclopedia: Controversies on Grace, Thomism Wrote:From this consideration arises the fourth and last objection to the claim of the Thomists, that they have only apparently found in their physical premotion an infallible medium by which God knows in advance with absolute certainty all the free acts of his creatures, whether they be good or bad. For as these premotions, as has been shown above, must in their last analysis be considered the knell of freedom, they cannot well be considered as the means by which God obtains a foreknowledge of the free acts of rational agents. Consequently the claims and proper place of the scientia media in the system may be regarded as vindicated.

This objection seems to rest on the validity of the previous objections—that premotion is the knell of freedom; but I don’t think that premotion and freedom are necessarily as mutually exclusive as the Molinists think. 
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"Catholic Encyclopedia, Actual Grace" Wrote:The Catholic idea of sufficient grace is obtained by the distinction of a twofold element in every actual grace, its intrinsic energy (potestas agendi, vis) and its extrinsic efficiency (efficientia). Under the former aspect there exists between sufficient and efficacious grace, both considered in actu primo, no real, but only a logical, distinction; for sufficient grace also confers full power for action, but is condemned to unfruitfulness owing to the free resistance of the will. If, on the contrary, extrinsic efficiency be considered, it is evident that the will either co-operates freely or not . If it refuses its co-operation, even the strongest grace remains a merely sufficient one (gratia mere sufficiens) although by nature it would have been completely sufficient (gratia vere sufficiens) and with good will could have been efficacious. This ecclesiastical conception of the nature of sufficient grace, to which the Catholic systems of grace must invariably conform themselves, is nothing else but a reproduction of the teaching of the Bible. To cite only one text (Proverbs 1:24), the calling and the stretching-out of the hand of God certainly signifies the complete sufficiency of grace, just as the obstinate refusal of the sinner "to regard", is tantamount to the free rejection of the proffered hand. Augustine is in complete agreement with the constant tradition on this point, and Jansenists have vainly claimed him as one of their own. We have an example of his teaching in the following text: "Gratia Dei est quae hominum adjuvat voluntates; qua ut non adjuventur, in ipsis itidem causa est, non in Deo" ("It is the grace of God that helps the wills of men; and when they are not helped by it, the reason is in themselves, not in God." — Of Sin and Merit II.17). On the Greek Fathers see Isaac Habert, Theologia Graecor. Patrum, II, 6 sq. (Paris, 1646).

This isn't presented by Thomist as such, but as Catholic.  I thought it was relevant to the discussion.
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(08-23-2011, 01:02 AM)Doce Me Wrote:
"Catholic Encyclopedia, Actual Grace" Wrote:The Catholic idea of sufficient grace is obtained by the distinction of a twofold element in every actual grace, its intrinsic energy (potestas agendi, vis) and its extrinsic efficiency (efficientia). Under the former aspect there exists between sufficient and efficacious grace, both considered in actu primo, no real, but only a logical, distinction; for sufficient grace also confers full power for action, but is condemned to unfruitfulness owing to the free resistance of the will. If, on the contrary, extrinsic efficiency be considered, it is evident that the will either co-operates freely or not . If it refuses its co-operation, even the strongest grace remains a merely sufficient one (gratia mere sufficiens) although by nature it would have been completely sufficient (gratia vere sufficiens) and with good will could have been efficacious. This ecclesiastical conception of the nature of sufficient grace, to which the Catholic systems of grace must invariably conform themselves, is nothing else but a reproduction of the teaching of the Bible. To cite only one text (Proverbs 1:24), the calling and the stretching-out of the hand of God certainly signifies the complete sufficiency of grace, just as the obstinate refusal of the sinner "to regard", is tantamount to the free rejection of the proffered hand. Augustine is in complete agreement with the constant tradition on this point, and Jansenists have vainly claimed him as one of their own. We have an example of his teaching in the following text: "Gratia Dei est quae hominum adjuvat voluntates; qua ut non adjuventur, in ipsis itidem causa est, non in Deo" ("It is the grace of God that helps the wills of men; and when they are not helped by it, the reason is in themselves, not in God." — Of Sin and Merit II.17). On the Greek Fathers see Isaac Habert, Theologia Graecor. Patrum, II, 6 sq. (Paris, 1646).

This isn't presented by Thomist as such, but as Catholic.  I thought it was relevant to the discussion.

Very good. Thank you for providing that.
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I also have found this entry from the Catholic Encyclopedia useful to this discussion:
Final Perseverance Wrote:Final perseverance is the preservation of the state of grace till the end of life. The expression is taken from Matthew 10:22, "He that shall persevere unto the end, he shall be saved." A temporary continuance in grace, be it ever so long, evidently falls short of the obvious meaning of the above phrase, if it fails to reach the hour of death. On the other hand the saying of St. Matthew does not necessarily imply a lifelong and unbroken continuance in grace, since it is of faith that lost grace can be recovered. Between the temporary continuance or imperfect perseverance and the lifelong continuance or most perfect perseverance there is room for final perseverance as commonly understood, i.e., the preservation of grace from the last conversion till death. It may be viewed as a power or as an actual fact. As a power it means the ensemble of spiritual means whereby the human will is enabled to persevere unto the end if it duly co-operates. As an actual fact it means the de facto preservation of grace and implies two factors, one internal, i.e., the steadfast use of the various means of salvation, the other external, i.e., the timely coming of death while the soul is at peace with God. Theologians, aptly or not, call the former active and the latter passive perseverance. There may be passive perseverance without active, as when an infant dies immediately after Baptism, but the normal case, which alone is considered here, is that of a good death crowning a greater or lesser duration of well-doing. By what agency the combined stability in holiness and timeliness of death are brought about is a problem long debated among Christian writers. The Semipelagians of the fifth century, while forsaking the sweeping ethical naturalism of Pelagius and admitting on principle the graces of the will, contended nevertheless, that the final perseverance of the justified was sufficiently accounted for by the natural power of our free will; if sometimes, in order to tally with conciliar definitions, they called it a grace, it was but a misnomer, as that grace could be merited by man's natural exertions. Oppositely, the Reformers of the sixteenth century, partly followed by the Baianist and Jansenist school, so minimized the native power and moral value of our free will as to make final perseverance depend on God alone, while their pretended fiducial faith and inadmissibility of grace led to the conclusion that we can, in this world, have absolute certainty of our final perseverance.

I found this part, in particular, the most relevant to this discussion:
Quote:The Catholic doctrine, outlined by St. Augustine, chiefly in "De dono perseverantiae" and "De correptione et gratia", and the Council of Orange in Southern Gaul, received its full expression in the Council of Trent, sess. VI, c. xiii, can. 16 and 22:

The power of persevering
Canon 22 (Si quis dixerit justificatum vel sine speciali auxilio Dei in accepta justitia perseverare posse, vel cum eo non posse, anathema sit), by teaching that the justified cannot persevere without a special help of God, but with it can persevere, not only condemns both the naturalism of the Semipelagians and the false supernaturalism of the Reformers but also clearly implies that the power of perseverance is neither in the human will alone nor in God's grace solely, but in the combination of both, i.e., Divine grace aiding human will, and human will co-operating with Divine grace. The grace in question is called by the Council "a special help of God", apparently to distinguish it both from the concurrence of God in the natural order and habitual grace, neither of which were denied by the Semipelagians. Theologians, with a few exceptions, identify this special help with the sum total of actual graces vouchsafed to man.

Actual perseverance
The Council of Trent, using an expression coined by St. Augustine, calls it (magnum usque in finem perseverantiae donum) the great gift of final perseverance. "It consists", says Newman, "In an ever watchful superintendence of us on the part of our All-Merciful Lord, removing temptations which He sees will be fatal to us, succouring us at those times when we are in particular peril, whether from our negligence or other cause, and ordering the course of our life so that we may die at a time when He sees that we are in the state of grace." The supernatural character of such a gift is clearly asserted by Christ: "Holy Father, keep them in they name whom thou has given" (John 17:11); by St. Paul: "he, who hath begun a good work in you, will perfect it unto the day of Christ Jesus" (Philippians 1:6); and by St. Peter: "But the God of all grace, who hath called us unto his eternal glory in Christ Jesus, after you have suffered a little, will himself perfect you, and confirm you, and establish you" (1 Peter., v,10). The extreme preciousness of that supernatural gift places it alike beyond our certain knowledge and meriting power.
That we can never in this life be certain of our final perseverance is defined by the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, can. xvi): "Si quis magnum illud usque in finem perseverantiae donum se certo habiturum, absoluta et infallibili certitudine dixerit, nisi hoc ex speciali revelatione dedicerit, anathema sit". What places it beyond our meriting power is the obvious fact that revelation nowhere offers final perseverance, with it retinue of efficacious graces and its crown of a good death, as a reward for our actions, but, on the contrary, constantly reminds us that, as the Council of Trent puts it, "the gift of perseverance can come only from Him who has the power to confirm the standing and to raise the fallen". However, from our incapacity to certainly know and to strictly merit the great gift, we should not infer that nothing can be done towards it. Theologians unite in saying that final perseverance comes under the impetrative power of prayer and St. Liguori (Prayer, the great means of Salvation) would make it the dominant note and burden of our daily petitions. The sometimes distressing presentation of the present matter in the pulpit is due to the many sides of the problem, the impossibility of viewing them all in one sermon, and the idiosyncrasies of the speakers. Nor should the timorousness of the saints, graphically described by Newman, be so construed as to contradict the admonition of the Council of Trent, that "all should place the firmest hope in the succour of God". Singularly comforting is the teaching of such saints as St. Francis de Sales (Camus, "The Spirit of St. Francis de Sales", III, xiii) and St. Catherine of Genoa (Treatise of Purgatory, iv). They dwell on God's great mercy in granting final perseverance, and even in the case of notorious sinners they do not lose hope: God suffuses the sinners' dying hour with an extraordinary light and, showing them the hideousness of sin contrasting with His own infinite beauty, He makes a final appeal to them. For those only who, even then, obstinately cling to their sin does the saying of Sirach 5:7, assume a sombre meaning "mercy and wrath quickly come from him, and his wrath looketh upon sinners". (See GRACE).
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(08-27-2011, 01:24 AM)INPEFESS Wrote: I also have found this entry from the Catholic Encyclopedia useful to this discussion:
Final Perseverance Wrote:Actual perseverance
The Council of Trent, using an expression coined by St. Augustine, calls it (magnum usque in finem perseverantiae donum) the great gift of final perseverance. "It consists", says Newman, "In an ever watchful superintendence of us on the part of our All-Merciful Lord, removing temptations which He sees will be fatal to us, succouring us at those times when we are in particular peril, whether from our negligence or other cause, and ordering the course of our life so that we may die at a time when He sees that we are in the state of grace." The supernatural character of such a gift is clearly asserted by Christ: "Holy Father, keep them in they name whom thou has given" (John 17:11); by St. Paul: "he, who hath begun a good work in you, will perfect it unto the day of Christ Jesus" (Philippians 1:6); and by St. Peter: "But the God of all grace, who hath called us unto his eternal glory in Christ Jesus, after you have suffered a little, will himself perfect you, and confirm you, and establish you" (1 Peter., v,10). The extreme preciousness of that supernatural gift places it alike beyond our certain knowledge and meriting power.
That we can never in this life be certain of our final perseverance is defined by the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, can. xvi): "Si quis magnum illud usque in finem perseverantiae donum se certo habiturum, absoluta et infallibili certitudine dixerit, nisi hoc ex speciali revelatione dedicerit, anathema sit". What places it beyond our meriting power is the obvious fact that revelation nowhere offers final perseverance, with it retinue of efficacious graces and its crown of a good death, as a reward for our actions, but, on the contrary, constantly reminds us that, as the Council of Trent puts it, "the gift of perseverance can come only from Him who has the power to confirm the standing and to raise the fallen". However, from our incapacity to certainly know and to strictly merit the great gift, we should not infer that nothing can be done towards it. Theologians unite in saying that final perseverance comes under the impetrative power of prayer and St. Liguori (Prayer, the great means of Salvation) would make it the dominant note and burden of our daily petitions. The sometimes distressing presentation of the present matter in the pulpit is due to the many sides of the problem, the impossibility of viewing them all in one sermon, and the idiosyncrasies of the speakers. Nor should the timorousness of the saints, graphically described by Newman, be so construed as to contradict the admonition of the Council of Trent, that "all should place the firmest hope in the succour of God". Singularly comforting is the teaching of such saints as St. Francis de Sales (Camus, "The Spirit of St. Francis de Sales", III, xiii) and St. Catherine of Genoa (Treatise of Purgatory, iv). They dwell on God's great mercy in granting final perseverance, and even in the case of notorious sinners they do not lose hope: God suffuses the sinners' dying hour with an extraordinary light and, showing them the hideousness of sin contrasting with His own infinite beauty, He makes a final appeal to them. For those only who, even then, obstinately cling to their sin does the saying of Sirach 5:7, assume a sombre meaning "mercy and wrath quickly come from him, and his wrath looketh upon sinners". (See GRACE).

Yes, I think this is what the Church teaches.

God does not abandon the reprobate before the end of their life to the pit of their own sin, utterly withdrawing His grace from them.  He makes a final appeal even to them; they are reprobate because they obstinately do not accept even His final appeal.

This truth may look like the presumption of final preservation to those who do not understand the life-long love of God for every man.  It IS presumption for those who do not care for or wish to return that life-long love.
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(08-27-2011, 06:37 PM)Doce Me Wrote:
(08-27-2011, 01:24 AM)INPEFESS Wrote: I also have found this entry from the Catholic Encyclopedia useful to this discussion:
Final Perseverance Wrote:Actual perseverance
The Council of Trent, using an expression coined by St. Augustine, calls it (magnum usque in finem perseverantiae donum) the great gift of final perseverance. "It consists", says Newman, "In an ever watchful superintendence of us on the part of our All-Merciful Lord, removing temptations which He sees will be fatal to us, succouring us at those times when we are in particular peril, whether from our negligence or other cause, and ordering the course of our life so that we may die at a time when He sees that we are in the state of grace." The supernatural character of such a gift is clearly asserted by Christ: "Holy Father, keep them in they name whom thou has given" (John 17:11); by St. Paul: "he, who hath begun a good work in you, will perfect it unto the day of Christ Jesus" (Philippians 1:6); and by St. Peter: "But the God of all grace, who hath called us unto his eternal glory in Christ Jesus, after you have suffered a little, will himself perfect you, and confirm you, and establish you" (1 Peter., v,10). The extreme preciousness of that supernatural gift places it alike beyond our certain knowledge and meriting power.
That we can never in this life be certain of our final perseverance is defined by the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, can. xvi): "Si quis magnum illud usque in finem perseverantiae donum se certo habiturum, absoluta et infallibili certitudine dixerit, nisi hoc ex speciali revelatione dedicerit, anathema sit". What places it beyond our meriting power is the obvious fact that revelation nowhere offers final perseverance, with it retinue of efficacious graces and its crown of a good death, as a reward for our actions, but, on the contrary, constantly reminds us that, as the Council of Trent puts it, "the gift of perseverance can come only from Him who has the power to confirm the standing and to raise the fallen". However, from our incapacity to certainly know and to strictly merit the great gift, we should not infer that nothing can be done towards it. Theologians unite in saying that final perseverance comes under the impetrative power of prayer and St. Liguori (Prayer, the great means of Salvation) would make it the dominant note and burden of our daily petitions. The sometimes distressing presentation of the present matter in the pulpit is due to the many sides of the problem, the impossibility of viewing them all in one sermon, and the idiosyncrasies of the speakers. Nor should the timorousness of the saints, graphically described by Newman, be so construed as to contradict the admonition of the Council of Trent, that "all should place the firmest hope in the succour of God". Singularly comforting is the teaching of such saints as St. Francis de Sales (Camus, "The Spirit of St. Francis de Sales", III, xiii) and St. Catherine of Genoa (Treatise of Purgatory, iv). They dwell on God's great mercy in granting final perseverance, and even in the case of notorious sinners they do not lose hope: God suffuses the sinners' dying hour with an extraordinary light and, showing them the hideousness of sin contrasting with His own infinite beauty, He makes a final appeal to them. For those only who, even then, obstinately cling to their sin does the saying of Sirach 5:7, assume a sombre meaning "mercy and wrath quickly come from him, and his wrath looketh upon sinners". (See GRACE).

Yes, I think this is what the Church teaches.

God does not abandon the reprobate before the end of their life to the pit of their own sin, utterly withdrawing His grace from them.  He makes a final appeal even to them; they are reprobate because they obstinately do not accept even His final appeal.

This truth may look like the presumption of final preservation to those who do not understand the life-long love of God for every man.  It IS presumption for those who do not care for or wish to return that life-long love.

I find it interesting to note that the article sems to indicate that, though it is God's free gift, there can be some action taken toward receiving it:
Quote:However, from our incapacity to certainly know and to strictly merit the great gift, we should not infer that nothing can be done towards it. Theologians unite in saying that final perseverance comes under the impetrative power of prayer and St. Liguori (Prayer, the great means of Salvation) would make it the dominant note and burden of our daily petitions.

So, if Final Perseverance can be petitioned through prayer, and prayer is a response to grace, but requires the co-operation of the will, than it must be concluded that the gift of Final Perseverance is, in a sense, or at least in some cases, conditional upon the free determination of the will to pray, such that even the gift of Final Perseverance requires the free co-operation of the will for efficacy.
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