Teachings Contrary to Tradition? Religious Liberty
#21
(02-02-2012, 08:12 PM)Someone1776 Wrote: How the Catholic Encylopedia was produced:

Quote:In addition to the names already conspicuous in Catholic literature, the list was drawn up after consultation with well-informed persons in various countries. Inquiries were sent to the Catholic colleges, seminaries and universities in the United States Canada, England, Ireland, Scotland and Australia. The Bishops in the English-speaking countries were requested to suggest writers for articles on their respective dioceses and the political divisions, such as the States of the Union, in which their dioceses are situated. The heads of religious orders and congregations were consulted regarding the assignment of each article in which they might be directly interested. Authorities on Catholic subjects in the non-Catholic institutions of learning in this country were also invited to cooperate. By correspondence or by personal visits, the editors secured contributions from prominent writers on the Continent of Europe, especially among the professors of the various universities and members of learned societies. The fact that the list includes 1452 names, representing 43 countries, sufficiently attests the international character of the Encyclopedia. Furthermore, it can be said without exaggeration that no other work has ever been produced by the joint labours of so many Catholic men and women representing the clergy, the laity, the professions, and the various lines of scientific and literary activity. The list of contributors to each volume is in itself an object lesson; it shows in a concrete way the intellectual forces that the Church has developed and animated with her spirit.
 

Damn shame so many knowledgeable Catholics knew nothing about the faith 100 years ago.   

A) Lets not elevate the encyclopedia to being part of the magisterium
B) Not everyone who worked on the encyclopedia would have worked on every bit, in fact it is certain they did not
Reply
#22
From Pius XII:

Quote:THE WORLD COMMUNITY
AND RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE

To the Fifth Annual Congress
of the Union of Italian
Catholic Jurists,
Rome, Dec. 6, 1953

INTRODUCTION
1.   Beloved sons of the Union of Italian Catholic Jurists, We are greatly pleased to see you gathered around Us.  We welcome you wholeheartedly.

2.   At Our summer residence in the beginning of October, We met with another Congress of Jurists whose purpose was to deal with international penal law.  Your convention has, rather, a national character; but the subject it is considering, "The Nation and the International Community," once again touches the relations between peoples and sovereign States.

3.   It is not by chance that many Congresses are studying international questions, be they scientific, economic or political.  It is obvious that relations between individuals of various nations and between nations themselves are growing in number and in depth.  Accordingly, a right ordering of international relations, both private and public, is urgently needed; more so since this mutual drawing together is caused not only by vastly technological progress and by free choice, but also by the more profound action of an intrinsic law of growth.  We must, therefore, not repress this growth, but foster and promote it.

I: TOWARD A WORLD COMMUNITY
4.   In this task of enlarging the area of  unity, communities of States and peoples, whether already existing or only a desirable goal to be achieved, naturally have a special importance.  They are communities in which sovereign States, that is, States that are subject to no other State, unite in a juridical community, for the attainment of definite judicial ends.  To compare them to past and present world empires--in which different racial stocks, peoples and States become fused, willingly or unwillingly, into a single conglomeration of States--would give a false idea of these communities.  But in the present instance, States remaining sovereign, freely unite into a judicial community.

IS A JUDICIAL WORLD COMMUNITY UTOPIAN?
5.   In this connection, the history of the world reveals a succession of struggle for power.  Undoubtedly, the establishment of a judicial community of free States might seem almost utopian.  Past conflicts too often have been provoked by the will to subjugate other nations and to extend the range of one's own power.  These conflicts have also come about by the necessity of defending one's own liberty and one's own independent existence.
6.   Now, on the contrary, it is precisely the desire to forestall threatening conflcts that compels the formation of a supernational judicial community; even practical discussions themselves, which certainly carry considerable weight, are directed toward the working out of peace.  Finally, perhaps it is precisely this mingling of men of different nations because of technological progress that has awakened the faith, implanted in the minds and hearts of men, in a higher community of men, willed by the Creator  and rooted in the unity of their common origin, nature and final destiny.

II: PRIMACY OF THE NATURAL LAW
7.   These and other similar considerations reveal that progress toward the establishment of a community of peoples does not have the will of the States as its unique and ultimate norm, but rather, nature or the Creator.  The right to existence, the right to be respected by others, the right to one's good name, the right to one's own national character and culture, the right to progress, the right to the observance of international treaties and other equivalent rights are exigencies of the law of nations, dictated by nature itself.
8.   The positive law of peoples is also indispensable in the community of States.  It defines the right derived from nature more exactly and adopts them to concrete circumstances.  With the understanding that an agreement, once freely entered into, shall be binding, positive law has the office of making other provisions, directed of course, toward the common good.  In this community of nations, every State, therefore, becomes a part of the system of international law, as also of natural law, which sustains and crowns the whole.

WHAT IS "SOVEREIGNTY"?
9.   Viewed in this manner, a State is no longer--nor in fact, has it ever been--"sovereign" in the sense of being entirely free of restrictions.  In the true sense of the word, "sovereignty" means autarchy (self-rule) and exclusive authority to regulate the affairs of a definite territory, always within the scope of international law, without, however, any dependence upon the juridical system of any other State.
10.   Every State is immediately subject to international law.  States lacking this fullness of power, or those to which international law does not guarantee freedom from encroachment by the forces of another State, would not themselves be considered sovereign.  But no State could complain about the limitation of its sovereignty if it were not allowed to act arbitrarily and without regard for the rights of other States.  State sovereignty is not divine.  Nor is it an omnipotence that is inherent in the State in the Hegelian sense, or in the context of absolute juridical positivism.

III: DIFFICULTIES TO BE OVERCOME
11.   We need not explain to you, students devoted to the law, that the foundation, maintenance and operation of a real community of States, especially one that embraces all the races and nations of the world, give rise to a whole series of complicated problems that cannot be solved by a simple "Yes" or "No."
12.   These are the problems: the question of race and origin with their biological, psychological and social consequences; the question of language; the question of family relations differing according to nations, between husband and wife, between parents and kin; the question of equality or the equivalence of rights in reference to property, contracts and persons, for the citizens of one sovereign State, who either live for a short time within the confines of another State or establish a permanent domicile there and at the same time retain their own nationality; the questions of the right of immigration or emigration, and other similar questions.
13.   The jurist, the statesman, the individual State as well as the community of States must take into account all the inborn tendencies of individuals and communities in their reciprocal contracts and relations with each other.  Such would be the tendency to adapt or to assimilate, often pushed to the extreme of absorption; or on the contrary, the tendency to exclude and to destroy all that appears incapable of assimilation; the tendency to expand, or, on the contrary, to withdraw and segregate; the tendency to give oneself entirely, forgetful of self, and contrariwise, to be selfish without service to others; the lust for power, the yearning to keep others in subjection, etc.
14.   The dynamics of these tendencies toward self-advancement or self-defense is rooted in the nature of the individual man, the nature of nations, races and communities.  Each has its own limitations and shortcomings.  None is perfect, containing all that is good and just.  God alone, the origin of all things, because He is infinite, contains within Himself all that is good.

FUNDAMENTAL THEORETICAL PRINCIPLE TO
COPE WITH DIFFICULTIES
15.   From what We have said, it is easy to deduce the fundamental theoretical principle of coping with these difficulties and tendencies: within the limits of what is possible and lawful, to promote everything that makes union easy and more effective; to remove everything that disturbs union; at times to endure what cannot be immediately solved, but which, on the other hand, must not be allowed to destroy the community of nations for the sake of a higher good expected to come of it.  The difficulty rests in the application of this principle.

IV: THE PROBLEM OF CO-EXISTENCE
16.   In this connection, We would like you, who are happy to be called Catholic jurists, to consider one of the problems that arises in a community of nations, that is, the practical coexistence of Catholic communities with those that are non-Catholic.
17.   According to the religious beliefs of a great majority of citizens, or by reason of an explicit declaration of their laws, the peoples and the member-States of the international community will be devided into Christians, non-Christians, those who are indifferent to religion or consciously secular, or even openly atheistic.  Religion and moral interests will require a well-defined rule or ordinance applicable to the whole international community, effective everywhere within the domain of each of the member-States in the international community.  This rule or ordinance could probably be stated in the following terms:
18.   Within its own territory and for its own citizens, each State shall regulate its religious and moral affairs according to its own laws; nevertheless, throughout the whole territory of the international community, the citizens of each member-State shall be able to exercise their own religious beliefs and ethical and religious practices, insofar as these practices do not violate the penal laws of the State in which they are residing.

CAN CATHOLICS CONSENT TO TOLERATION?
19.   Here a question poses itself to the jurist, the statesman and to the Catholic State itself:  Can consent be given to the ruling or ordinance above, when membership in the international community is at stake?
20.   Now in regard to religious and moral interests, a twofold question arises:
       1.   The first concerns objective truth and the obligation in conscience to follow what is objectively
             true and good.
       2.   The second concerns the practical attitude of the international community toward the individual
             sovereign State, and the attitude of the individual sovereign State toward the international
             community insofar as religion and morality are concerned.
21.   The first cannot easily be the object of a discussion and ruling between the individual States and the international community, especially in the case where a pluralism of religious beliefs occurs within the community itself.  The second question, on the other hand, is of the greatest weight and urgency.

V: LIMITS OF HUMAN AUTHORITY
22.   This is the manner in which to answer the second question.  Above all we must clearly state: no human authority, no State, no community of States, whatever be their religious character, can give a positive command or positive authorization to teach or to do that which would be contrary to religious truth or the moral good.  Such a command or authorization would not be obligatory and would remain ineffective.  No authority can give such a command, for it is against nature to oblige the spirit and will of man to error and evil or to consider one or the other as indifferent.  Not even God could give such a positive command or such positive authorization because these would be contradictory to His absolute Truth and Sanctity.

TOLERATION OR SUPPRESSION
23.   Another essentially different question is this:  whether a norm may be established in a community of States, at least under certain circumstances, whereby the free practice of religious or moral beliefs which is valid in one of the member-States, be not impeded in the entire territory in the community of nations by means of State laws or coersive measures?  In other words, we raise the question of whether the "non impedire" or toleration is permissible in these circumstances, and, as a consequence of this, whether positive suppression may (under these same circumstances) cease to be of binding obligation.
24.   We have now adduced the authority of God.  Can God, even though it would be easily possible for Him to suppress error and eliminate moral wrong, choose the "non impedire" without contradicting His own infinite perfection?  Could it be that in certain circumstances He gives no command to men, imposes no obligation, does not even give the right to impede and suppress what is erroneous and false?  A look in reality gives an affirmative answer.

[b]SUPPRESSION IS INVALID UNCONDITIONALLY
AND ABSOLUTELY

25.   Reality shows that error and sin are in the world in great measure.  God reproves them; yet He permits them to exist.  Therefore the affirmation that religious and moral error must always be impeded whenever possible, because to tolerate them is in itself immoral--is not valid unconditionally and absolutely.
26.   Moreover, God has not even given to human authority such an absolute and universal command, in matters of faith and morals.  The common conviction of mankind, Christian conscious, the sources of revelation, and the practice of the Church have never recognized the existence of such a command.
27.   We omit here other Scriptural texts in support of this argument, except that of Christ in the parable of the Cockle which gives the following admonition:  Let the cockle grow in the field of the world together with the good seed, in view of the harvest (Cf. Matt. 13, 24-30.).  The duty to suppress moral and religious error cannot, therefore, be an ultimate norm of action.  It must be subordinated to higher and more general norms, which, under certain circumstances, permit and may even make it appear that the best choice for promoting greater good is the toleration of error.


TWO PRINCIPLES FOR STATESMEN
28.   Thus We have clarified the two principles from which, in concrete cases, we obtain the answer to every serious question concerning the attitude to be adopted by the jurist, the statesman and the sovereign Catholic State with regard to a formula of religious and moral toleration described above, in the consideration of the community of nations.
       1.   That which does not objectively correspond to the truth and to the norm of morality, does not in
             turn have the right to exist, to be propagated or to be activated.
       2.   Failure to impede this with State laws or by coercive measures can, nevertheless, be justified in
             the interests of a higher and more general good.
29.   Before all else, the Catholic statesman must judge if this condition, i.e., the "question of fact," is verified in a concrete case.  He will be guided in his decision by weighing the dangerous consequences that stem from tolerance as opposed to those from which, according to a wise prognosis can accrue to this same international community as such, and indirectly to the member-State.  In the realm of religion and morality, he will also ask for the judgment of the Church.  Only the Roman Pontiff, to whom Christ has entrusted the guidance of the whole Church, is competent to speak for her in the last instance on such decisive questions touching international life.

VI: THE CHURCH'S MISSION
30.   Today the institution of a community of nations has been partly realized.  The fact that it is striving to establish and consolidate itself upon a higher and more perfect level is itself an ascent from the lower to the higher, that is, from a plurality of sovereign States towards the greatest unity possible.
31.   The Church of Christ has, by virtue of the mandate of our divine Founder, a similar universal mission.  She must draw to herself and bind together in a religious unity the men of all races and of all times.  But in this case, the process is in a certain sense the contrary:  she descends from the higher to the lower.  In the former case, the superior juridical unity of the community of nations was or is still to be realized.  In this latter case, the juridical community, with its universal end, its constitution, its powers and those invested with these powers, are already established by the will and decree of Christ Himself.  The duty of this universal community, from the very beginning is to incorporate within itself all men and all races (Cf. Matt. 28, 19.), thereby to bring them wholly to the truth and grace of Jesus Christ.
32.   In the fulfillment of her mission, the Church has always been faced and is still faced in large measure with the same problems which must be solved by the functioning of a community of sovereign States.  But she feels them even more acutely, because she is bound by the purpose of her mission, determined by her Founder Himself--a purpose which penetrates to the very depths of the spirit and heart of man.  In this state of affairs, conflicts are inevitable, and history reveals that they have always been, they still occur and, according to the words of the Lord, there will be conflicts till the end of time.
33.   Moreover, the Church's mission has always brought her in contact with men and nations of the most highly developed culture as well as with those almost incredibly retarded, and with all possible intermediate degrees of civilization: diversity of race, of language, of philosophy, of religious belief, of national aspirations and characteristics; free peoples and enslaved peoples; peoples that have never belonged to the Church and peoples who have been separated from her communion.

THE CHURCH MUST LIVE AMONG NATIONS
34.   The Church must live among them and with them; she can never declare herself before anyone to be "not interested."  The mandate imposed upon her by her divine Founder forbids her to follow a "do nothing or laisses-faire" policy.  She has the duty of teaching, of educating with all the inflexibility of truth and goodness.  With this absolute obligation she must remain and work among men and nations whose modes of thought differ totally one from another.
35.   Let us now, however, consider once again the two propositions mentioned above.  We shall first consider the one which unconditionally denies everything that is religiously false and morally wrong.  With regard to this point there never has been, nor is there now, any inconsistency or any compromise either in theory or practice in the Church.  In the course of history her deportment has not changed, nor can it change, whenever, or wherever under the most varied conditions, she is confronted with an alternative: incense for idols or blood for Christ.
36.   Eternal Rome, the place in which you now find yourselves, with the relics of a past greatness and the glorious memories of its martyrs, is the most eloquent witness to the Church's answer.  Incense was not burned before idols and the blood of Christians flowed and consecrated the ground.  But the temples of the gods languish in the cold devastation of ruins howsoever majestic; while the faithful of all nations and all tongues fervently repeat the ancient Creed of the Apostles at the tombs of the  martyrs.

APPLICATION OF TOLERATION TO
NEW WORLD UNION
37.   As to the second proposition, that is to say, tolerance under certain specific circumstance, even when suppression might be invoked, the Church--out of regard for those who in good conscience (erroneous yes, but invincibly so) hold divergent views--has been seen to act according to the tolerance she exercised after being constituted the State-Church under Constantine the Great and other Christian Emperors, always from the highest and noblest motives.  So she acts today and so will she act in the future when she is faced with the same necessity.
38.   In such special cases, the Church's attitude is determined by the necessity of safeguarding the common good of the Church and the State within individual States, on the one hand, and on the other, the common good of the Universal Church, the Reign of God over the whole world.  In considering the "pro" and "con" for resolving the "question of fact," no other norms are valid for the Church except those which we have already indicated for the Catholic jurist and statesman, even as to what concerns the final and Supreme Judge in these matters.


VII: CONCORDATS
39.   What we have set forth may also be useful for the Catholic jurist and statesman when in their studies or the exercise of their profession, they examine agreements (Concordats, Treaties, Agreements, Modus Vivendi, etc.)  which the Church (i.e., for a long time now, the Holy See.)  has concluded in the past and still concludes with sovereign States.

WHAT IS A CONCORDAT?
40.   For her, Concordats are an expression of the collaboration between Church and State.  In principle, i.e., in theory, the Church cannot approve the complete separation of the two powers.  Therefore, Concordats must assure to the Church a stable condition of right and of fact within the State with which they are made.  They must guarantee to her full independence in the fulfillment of her Divine Mission.
41.   It is possible for the Church and the State to proclaim their common religious conviction by means of a Concordat.  It is also possible that a Concordat contain, together with other goals, provisions to forestall disputes dealing with questions of principle and to remove from the very beginning possible matter of conflicts.  When the Church has signed a Concordat, it is valid for all that is contained therein.  But with the mutual consent of both high contracting parties it might have different degrees of meaning:  it may signify and express approval, but it may also set forth a simple tolerance according to those two principles which are the norm for the coexistence of the Church and her faithful with the Civil power and with other peoples of different religious beliefs.
42.   Beloved Sons, this is what We intended to treat of with you, more fully.  For the rest, We are certain that the international community can banish every danger of war and establish peace.  As far as the Church is concerned, We are confident that the international community can guarantee to her freedom of action everywhere, so that she may be able to establish in the mind and in the heart, in the thoughts and the action of man, the Reign of Him Who is the Redeemer, the Lawgiver, the Judge, the Lord of the World, Jesus Christ, God, Who rules over all things blessed forever, (Rom. 9, 5.).
43.   While with Our Paternal good wishes We follow your labors for the greater good of nations and for the perfecting of international relations, We impart to you, as a pledge of the richest Divine Graces from the fullness of Our heart, the Apostolic Blessing. 
Reply
#23
(02-02-2012, 08:18 PM)TrentCath Wrote:
(02-02-2012, 08:16 PM)JayneK Wrote:
(02-02-2012, 08:07 PM)TrentCath Wrote: The article does seem a little confused. On the one hand it states
[ . .  .]
Nevertheless the teaching of the popes on this matter is quite clear.

All these big blocks of text are a bit overwhelming and it is not clear to me at all.  There seem to be all these subtle distinctions going on that I find hard to follow.  I would find it helpful if people could give short summaries of the things they are citing.

Really, I'm not arguing (which is what I suppose most people expect from me). I'm just trying to understand and it's hard.

They are the same as you would get if you read the encyclopedia itself, I am sorry but I cannot 'summarise' things that would ruin the point of the exercise, it is not my argument that counts but rather the sources themselves, besides which that summary is much smaller than the entire length of the article.

I did read the encyclopedia article.  You seem to be juxtaposing two passages from it as if there is some contradiction between them but I have no idea what you think this contradiction is.
Reply
#24
(02-02-2012, 08:59 PM)JayneK Wrote:
(02-02-2012, 08:18 PM)TrentCath Wrote:
(02-02-2012, 08:16 PM)JayneK Wrote:
(02-02-2012, 08:07 PM)TrentCath Wrote: The article does seem a little confused. On the one hand it states
[ . .  .]
Nevertheless the teaching of the popes on this matter is quite clear.

All these big blocks of text are a bit overwhelming and it is not clear to me at all.  There seem to be all these subtle distinctions going on that I find hard to follow.  I would find it helpful if people could give short summaries of the things they are citing.

Really, I'm not arguing (which is what I suppose most people expect from me). I'm just trying to understand and it's hard.

They are the same as you would get if you read the encyclopedia itself, I am sorry but I cannot 'summarise' things that would ruin the point of the exercise, it is not my argument that counts but rather the sources themselves, besides which that summary is much smaller than the entire length of the article.

I did read the encyclopedia article.  You seem to be juxtaposing two passages from it as if there is some contradiction between them but I have no idea what you think this contradiction is.

Perhaps then you should have said that rather than something rather more confusing?

My point is it upholds traditional teaching but then appears to make allowances, which seem to contradict this, that is all.
Reply
#25
(02-02-2012, 08:51 PM)Someone1776 Wrote: From Pius XII:

Quote:THE WORLD COMMUNITY
AND RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE

To the Fifth Annual Congress
of the Union of Italian
Catholic Jurists,
Rome, Dec. 6, 1953

INTRODUCTION
1.   Beloved sons of the Union of Italian Catholic Jurists, We are greatly pleased to see you gathered around Us.  We welcome you wholeheartedly.

2.   At Our summer residence in the beginning of October, We met with another Congress of Jurists whose purpose was to deal with international penal law.  Your convention has, rather, a national character; but the subject it is considering, "The Nation and the International Community," once again touches the relations between peoples and sovereign States.

3.   It is not by chance that many Congresses are studying international questions, be they scientific, economic or political.  It is obvious that relations between individuals of various nations and between nations themselves are growing in number and in depth.  Accordingly, a right ordering of international relations, both private and public, is urgently needed; more so since this mutual drawing together is caused not only by vastly technological progress and by free choice, but also by the more profound action of an intrinsic law of growth.  We must, therefore, not repress this growth, but foster and promote it.

I: TOWARD A WORLD COMMUNITY
4.   In this task of enlarging the area of  unity, communities of States and peoples, whether already existing or only a desirable goal to be achieved, naturally have a special importance.  They are communities in which sovereign States, that is, States that are subject to no other State, unite in a juridical community, for the attainment of definite judicial ends.  To compare them to past and present world empires--in which different racial stocks, peoples and States become fused, willingly or unwillingly, into a single conglomeration of States--would give a false idea of these communities.  But in the present instance, States remaining sovereign, freely unite into a judicial community.

IS A JUDICIAL WORLD COMMUNITY UTOPIAN?
5.   In this connection, the history of the world reveals a succession of struggle for power.  Undoubtedly, the establishment of a judicial community of free States might seem almost utopian.  Past conflicts too often have been provoked by the will to subjugate other nations and to extend the range of one's own power.  These conflicts have also come about by the necessity of defending one's own liberty and one's own independent existence.
6.   Now, on the contrary, it is precisely the desire to forestall threatening conflcts that compels the formation of a supernational judicial community; even practical discussions themselves, which certainly carry considerable weight, are directed toward the working out of peace.  Finally, perhaps it is precisely this mingling of men of different nations because of technological progress that has awakened the faith, implanted in the minds and hearts of men, in a higher community of men, willed by the Creator  and rooted in the unity of their common origin, nature and final destiny.

II: PRIMACY OF THE NATURAL LAW
7.   These and other similar considerations reveal that progress toward the establishment of a community of peoples does not have the will of the States as its unique and ultimate norm, but rather, nature or the Creator.  The right to existence, the right to be respected by others, the right to one's good name, the right to one's own national character and culture, the right to progress, the right to the observance of international treaties and other equivalent rights are exigencies of the law of nations, dictated by nature itself.
8.   The positive law of peoples is also indispensable in the community of States.  It defines the right derived from nature more exactly and adopts them to concrete circumstances.  With the understanding that an agreement, once freely entered into, shall be binding, positive law has the office of making other provisions, directed of course, toward the common good.  In this community of nations, every State, therefore, becomes a part of the system of international law, as also of natural law, which sustains and crowns the whole.

WHAT IS "SOVEREIGNTY"?
9.   Viewed in this manner, a State is no longer--nor in fact, has it ever been--"sovereign" in the sense of being entirely free of restrictions.  In the true sense of the word, "sovereignty" means autarchy (self-rule) and exclusive authority to regulate the affairs of a definite territory, always within the scope of international law, without, however, any dependence upon the juridical system of any other State.
10.   Every State is immediately subject to international law.  States lacking this fullness of power, or those to which international law does not guarantee freedom from encroachment by the forces of another State, would not themselves be considered sovereign.  But no State could complain about the limitation of its sovereignty if it were not allowed to act arbitrarily and without regard for the rights of other States.  State sovereignty is not divine.  Nor is it an omnipotence that is inherent in the State in the Hegelian sense, or in the context of absolute juridical positivism.

III: DIFFICULTIES TO BE OVERCOME
11.   We need not explain to you, students devoted to the law, that the foundation, maintenance and operation of a real community of States, especially one that embraces all the races and nations of the world, give rise to a whole series of complicated problems that cannot be solved by a simple "Yes" or "No."
12.   These are the problems: the question of race and origin with their biological, psychological and social consequences; the question of language; the question of family relations differing according to nations, between husband and wife, between parents and kin; the question of equality or the equivalence of rights in reference to property, contracts and persons, for the citizens of one sovereign State, who either live for a short time within the confines of another State or establish a permanent domicile there and at the same time retain their own nationality; the questions of the right of immigration or emigration, and other similar questions.
13.   The jurist, the statesman, the individual State as well as the community of States must take into account all the inborn tendencies of individuals and communities in their reciprocal contracts and relations with each other.  Such would be the tendency to adapt or to assimilate, often pushed to the extreme of absorption; or on the contrary, the tendency to exclude and to destroy all that appears incapable of assimilation; the tendency to expand, or, on the contrary, to withdraw and segregate; the tendency to give oneself entirely, forgetful of self, and contrariwise, to be selfish without service to others; the lust for power, the yearning to keep others in subjection, etc.
14.   The dynamics of these tendencies toward self-advancement or self-defense is rooted in the nature of the individual man, the nature of nations, races and communities.  Each has its own limitations and shortcomings.  None is perfect, containing all that is good and just.  God alone, the origin of all things, because He is infinite, contains within Himself all that is good.

FUNDAMENTAL THEORETICAL PRINCIPLE TO
COPE WITH DIFFICULTIES
15.   From what We have said, it is easy to deduce the fundamental theoretical principle of coping with these difficulties and tendencies: within the limits of what is possible and lawful, to promote everything that makes union easy and more effective; to remove everything that disturbs union; at times to endure what cannot be immediately solved, but which, on the other hand, must not be allowed to destroy the community of nations for the sake of a higher good expected to come of it.  The difficulty rests in the application of this principle.

IV: THE PROBLEM OF CO-EXISTENCE
16.   In this connection, We would like you, who are happy to be called Catholic jurists, to consider one of the problems that arises in a community of nations, that is, the practical coexistence of Catholic communities with those that are non-Catholic.
17.   According to the religious beliefs of a great majority of citizens, or by reason of an explicit declaration of their laws, the peoples and the member-States of the international community will be devided into Christians, non-Christians, those who are indifferent to religion or consciously secular, or even openly atheistic.  Religion and moral interests will require a well-defined rule or ordinance applicable to the whole international community, effective everywhere within the domain of each of the member-States in the international community.  This rule or ordinance could probably be stated in the following terms:
18.   Within its own territory and for its own citizens, each State shall regulate its religious and moral affairs according to its own laws; nevertheless, throughout the whole territory of the international community, the citizens of each member-State shall be able to exercise their own religious beliefs and ethical and religious practices, insofar as these practices do not violate the penal laws of the State in which they are residing.

CAN CATHOLICS CONSENT TO TOLERATION?
19.   Here a question poses itself to the jurist, the statesman and to the Catholic State itself:  Can consent be given to the ruling or ordinance above, when membership in the international community is at stake?
20.   Now in regard to religious and moral interests, a twofold question arises:
       1.   The first concerns objective truth and the obligation in conscience to follow what is objectively
             true and good.
       2.   The second concerns the practical attitude of the international community toward the individual
             sovereign State, and the attitude of the individual sovereign State toward the international
             community insofar as religion and morality are concerned.
21.   The first cannot easily be the object of a discussion and ruling between the individual States and the international community, especially in the case where a pluralism of religious beliefs occurs within the community itself.  The second question, on the other hand, is of the greatest weight and urgency.

V: LIMITS OF HUMAN AUTHORITY
22.   This is the manner in which to answer the second question.  Above all we must clearly state: no human authority, no State, no community of States, whatever be their religious character, can give a positive command or positive authorization to teach or to do that which would be contrary to religious truth or the moral good.  Such a command or authorization would not be obligatory and would remain ineffective.  No authority can give such a command, for it is against nature to oblige the spirit and will of man to error and evil or to consider one or the other as indifferent.  Not even God could give such a positive command or such positive authorization because these would be contradictory to His absolute Truth and Sanctity.

TOLERATION OR SUPPRESSION
23.   Another essentially different question is this:  whether a norm may be established in a community of States, at least under certain circumstances, whereby the free practice of religious or moral beliefs which is valid in one of the member-States, be not impeded in the entire territory in the community of nations by means of State laws or coersive measures?  In other words, we raise the question of whether the "non impedire" or toleration is permissible in these circumstances, and, as a consequence of this, whether positive suppression may (under these same circumstances) cease to be of binding obligation.
24.   We have now adduced the authority of God.  Can God, even though it would be easily possible for Him to suppress error and eliminate moral wrong, choose the "non impedire" without contradicting His own infinite perfection?  Could it be that in certain circumstances He gives no command to men, imposes no obligation, does not even give the right to impede and suppress what is erroneous and false?  A look in reality gives an affirmative answer.

[b]SUPPRESSION IS INVALID UNCONDITIONALLY
AND ABSOLUTELY

25.   Reality shows that error and sin are in the world in great measure.  God reproves them; yet He permits them to exist.  Therefore the affirmation that religious and moral error must always be impeded whenever possible, because to tolerate them is in itself immoral--is not valid unconditionally and absolutely.
26.   Moreover, God has not even given to human authority such an absolute and universal command, in matters of faith and morals.  The common conviction of mankind, Christian conscious, the sources of revelation, and the practice of the Church have never recognized the existence of such a command.
27.   We omit here other Scriptural texts in support of this argument, except that of Christ in the parable of the Cockle which gives the following admonition:  Let the cockle grow in the field of the world together with the good seed, in view of the harvest (Cf. Matt. 13, 24-30.).  The duty to suppress moral and religious error cannot, therefore, be an ultimate norm of action.  It must be subordinated to higher and more general norms, which, under certain circumstances, permit and may even make it appear that the best choice for promoting greater good is the toleration of error.


TWO PRINCIPLES FOR STATESMEN
28.   Thus We have clarified the two principles from which, in concrete cases, we obtain the answer to every serious question concerning the attitude to be adopted by the jurist, the statesman and the sovereign Catholic State with regard to a formula of religious and moral toleration described above, in the consideration of the community of nations.
       1.   That which does not objectively correspond to the truth and to the norm of morality, does not in
             turn have the right to exist, to be propagated or to be activated.
       2.   Failure to impede this with State laws or by coercive measures can, nevertheless, be justified in
             the interests of a higher and more general good.
29.   Before all else, the Catholic statesman must judge if this condition, i.e., the "question of fact," is verified in a concrete case.  He will be guided in his decision by weighing the dangerous consequences that stem from tolerance as opposed to those from which, according to a wise prognosis can accrue to this same international community as such, and indirectly to the member-State.  In the realm of religion and morality, he will also ask for the judgment of the Church.  Only the Roman Pontiff, to whom Christ has entrusted the guidance of the whole Church, is competent to speak for her in the last instance on such decisive questions touching international life.

VI: THE CHURCH'S MISSION
30.   Today the institution of a community of nations has been partly realized.  The fact that it is striving to establish and consolidate itself upon a higher and more perfect level is itself an ascent from the lower to the higher, that is, from a plurality of sovereign States towards the greatest unity possible.
31.   The Church of Christ has, by virtue of the mandate of our divine Founder, a similar universal mission.  She must draw to herself and bind together in a religious unity the men of all races and of all times.  But in this case, the process is in a certain sense the contrary:  she descends from the higher to the lower.  In the former case, the superior juridical unity of the community of nations was or is still to be realized.  In this latter case, the juridical community, with its universal end, its constitution, its powers and those invested with these powers, are already established by the will and decree of Christ Himself.  The duty of this universal community, from the very beginning is to incorporate within itself all men and all races (Cf. Matt. 28, 19.), thereby to bring them wholly to the truth and grace of Jesus Christ.
32.   In the fulfillment of her mission, the Church has always been faced and is still faced in large measure with the same problems which must be solved by the functioning of a community of sovereign States.  But she feels them even more acutely, because she is bound by the purpose of her mission, determined by her Founder Himself--a purpose which penetrates to the very depths of the spirit and heart of man.  In this state of affairs, conflicts are inevitable, and history reveals that they have always been, they still occur and, according to the words of the Lord, there will be conflicts till the end of time.
33.   Moreover, the Church's mission has always brought her in contact with men and nations of the most highly developed culture as well as with those almost incredibly retarded, and with all possible intermediate degrees of civilization: diversity of race, of language, of philosophy, of religious belief, of national aspirations and characteristics; free peoples and enslaved peoples; peoples that have never belonged to the Church and peoples who have been separated from her communion.

THE CHURCH MUST LIVE AMONG NATIONS
34.   The Church must live among them and with them; she can never declare herself before anyone to be "not interested."  The mandate imposed upon her by her divine Founder forbids her to follow a "do nothing or laisses-faire" policy.  She has the duty of teaching, of educating with all the inflexibility of truth and goodness.  With this absolute obligation she must remain and work among men and nations whose modes of thought differ totally one from another.
35.   Let us now, however, consider once again the two propositions mentioned above.  We shall first consider the one which unconditionally denies everything that is religiously false and morally wrong.  With regard to this point there never has been, nor is there now, any inconsistency or any compromise either in theory or practice in the Church.  In the course of history her deportment has not changed, nor can it change, whenever, or wherever under the most varied conditions, she is confronted with an alternative: incense for idols or blood for Christ.
36.   Eternal Rome, the place in which you now find yourselves, with the relics of a past greatness and the glorious memories of its martyrs, is the most eloquent witness to the Church's answer.  Incense was not burned before idols and the blood of Christians flowed and consecrated the ground.  But the temples of the gods languish in the cold devastation of ruins howsoever majestic; while the faithful of all nations and all tongues fervently repeat the ancient Creed of the Apostles at the tombs of the  martyrs.

APPLICATION OF TOLERATION TO
NEW WORLD UNION
37.   As to the second proposition, that is to say, tolerance under certain specific circumstance, even when suppression might be invoked, the Church--out of regard for those who in good conscience (erroneous yes, but invincibly so) hold divergent views--has been seen to act according to the tolerance she exercised after being constituted the State-Church under Constantine the Great and other Christian Emperors, always from the highest and noblest motives.  So she acts today and so will she act in the future when she is faced with the same necessity.
38.   In such special cases, the Church's attitude is determined by the necessity of safeguarding the common good of the Church and the State within individual States, on the one hand, and on the other, the common good of the Universal Church, the Reign of God over the whole world.  In considering the "pro" and "con" for resolving the "question of fact," no other norms are valid for the Church except those which we have already indicated for the Catholic jurist and statesman, even as to what concerns the final and Supreme Judge in these matters.


VII: CONCORDATS
39.   What we have set forth may also be useful for the Catholic jurist and statesman when in their studies or the exercise of their profession, they examine agreements (Concordats, Treaties, Agreements, Modus Vivendi, etc.)  which the Church (i.e., for a long time now, the Holy See.)  has concluded in the past and still concludes with sovereign States.

WHAT IS A CONCORDAT?
40.   For her, Concordats are an expression of the collaboration between Church and State.  In principle, i.e., in theory, the Church cannot approve the complete separation of the two powers.  Therefore, Concordats must assure to the Church a stable condition of right and of fact within the State with which they are made.  They must guarantee to her full independence in the fulfillment of her Divine Mission.
41.   It is possible for the Church and the State to proclaim their common religious conviction by means of a Concordat.  It is also possible that a Concordat contain, together with other goals, provisions to forestall disputes dealing with questions of principle and to remove from the very beginning possible matter of conflicts.  When the Church has signed a Concordat, it is valid for all that is contained therein.  But with the mutual consent of both high contracting parties it might have different degrees of meaning:  it may signify and express approval, but it may also set forth a simple tolerance according to those two principles which are the norm for the coexistence of the Church and her faithful with the Civil power and with other peoples of different religious beliefs.
42.   Beloved Sons, this is what We intended to treat of with you, more fully.  For the rest, We are certain that the international community can banish every danger of war and establish peace.  As far as the Church is concerned, We are confident that the international community can guarantee to her freedom of action everywhere, so that she may be able to establish in the mind and in the heart, in the thoughts and the action of man, the Reign of Him Who is the Redeemer, the Lawgiver, the Judge, the Lord of the World, Jesus Christ, God, Who rules over all things blessed forever, (Rom. 9, 5.).
43.   While with Our Paternal good wishes We follow your labors for the greater good of nations and for the perfecting of international relations, We impart to you, as a pledge of the richest Divine Graces from the fullness of Our heart, the Apostolic Blessing. 

I see nothing new here  ???

It is again pragmatic religious tolerance under certain specific conditions and to a certain degree, not universal religious freedom.
Reply
#26
(02-02-2012, 08:20 PM)TrentCath Wrote: A) Lets not elevate the encyclopedia to being part of the magisterium

Obviously the encyclopedia is not part of the Magisterium, but it is written by expert who is aware of a vast body of information on the subject rather than the few passages taken out of context presented in this thread.  He seems more likely to know what the Church teaches than I could from reading a few encyclical quotes.
Reply
#27
(02-02-2012, 09:03 PM)TrentCath Wrote:
(02-02-2012, 08:59 PM)JayneK Wrote:
(02-02-2012, 08:18 PM)TrentCath Wrote:
(02-02-2012, 08:16 PM)JayneK Wrote:
(02-02-2012, 08:07 PM)TrentCath Wrote: The article does seem a little confused. On the one hand it states
[ . .  .]
Nevertheless the teaching of the popes on this matter is quite clear.

All these big blocks of text are a bit overwhelming and it is not clear to me at all.  There seem to be all these subtle distinctions going on that I find hard to follow.  I would find it helpful if people could give short summaries of the things they are citing.

Really, I'm not arguing (which is what I suppose most people expect from me). I'm just trying to understand and it's hard.

They are the same as you would get if you read the encyclopedia itself, I am sorry but I cannot 'summarise' things that would ruin the point of the exercise, it is not my argument that counts but rather the sources themselves, besides which that summary is much smaller than the entire length of the article.

I did read the encyclopedia article.  You seem to be juxtaposing two passages from it as if there is some contradiction between them but I have no idea what you think this contradiction is.

Perhaps then you should have said that rather than something rather more confusing?

My point is it upholds traditional teaching but then appears to make allowances, which seem to contradict this, that is all.

What are you claiming the traditional teaching is?  Which passage do you think upholds it?  Which passage do you think contradicts it and how?  You are expecting too much from your readers.
Reply
#28
Here is how Blessed John Henry Newman explained the Syllabus of Errors' condemnation of religious liberty. 

Quote:But I go further:—in fact the Pope has not said on this subject of conscience (for that is the main subject in question) what Mr. Gladstone makes him say. On this point I desiderate that fairness in his Pamphlet which we have a right to expect from him; and in truth his unfairness is wonderful. He says, pp. 15, 16, that the Holy See has " condemned" the maintainers of "the Liberty of the Press, of conscience, and of worship." Again, that the "Pontiff has condemned free speech, free writing, a free press, toleration of non-conformity, liberty of conscience," p. 42. Now, is not this accusation of a very wholesale character? Who would not understand it to mean that the Pope had pronounced a universal anathema against all these liberties in toto, and that English law, on the contrary, allowed those liberties in toto, which the Pope had condemned? But the Pope has done no such thing. The real question is, in what respect, in what measure, has he spoken against liberty :. the grant of liberty admits of degrees. Blackstone is careful to show how much more liberty the law allowed to the subject in his day, how much less severe it was in its safeguards against abuse, than it had used to be; but he never pretends that it is conceivable that liberty should have no boundary at all. The very idea of political society is based upon the principle that each member of it gives up a portion of his natural liberty for advantages which are greater than that liberty; and the question is, whether the Pope, in any act of his which touches us Catholics, in any ecclesiastical or theological' statement of his, has propounded any principle, doctrine, or view, which is not carried out in fact at this time in British courts of law, and would not be conceded by Blackstone. I repeat, the very notion of human society is a relinquishment, to a certain point, of the liberty of its members individually, for the sake of a common security. Would it be fair on that account to say that the British Constitution condemns all liberty of conscience in word and in deed?

We Catholics, on our part, are denied liberty of our religion by English law in various ways, but we do not complain, because a limit must be put to even innocent liberties, and we acquiesce in it for the social compensations which we gain on the whole. Our school boys cannot play cricket on Sunday, not even in country places, for fear of being taken before a magistrate and fined. In Scotland we cannot play music on. Sundays. Here we cannot sound a bell for church. I have had before now a lawyer's authority for saying that a religious procession is illegal even within our own premises. Till the last year or two we could not call our Bishops by the titles which our Religion gave them. A mandate from the Home Secretary obliged us to put off our cassocks when we went out of doors. We are forced to pay rates for the establishment of secular schools which we cannot use, and then we have to find means over again for building schools of our own. Why is not all this as much an outrage on our conscience as the prohibition upon Protestants at Home, Naples, and Malaga, before the late political changes—{not, to hold their services in a private house, or in the ambassador's, or outside the walls),—but to flaunt them in public and thereby to irritate the natives? Mr. Gladstone seems to think it is monstrous for the Holy See to sanction such a prohibition. If so, may we not call upon him to gain for us in Birmingham "the free exercise of our religion," in making a circuit of the streets in our vestments, and chanting the " Pange Lingua," and the protection of the police against the mob which would be sure to gather round us—particularly since we are English born, whereas the Protestants at Malaga or Naples were foreigners.1 But we have the good sense neither to feel such disabilities a hardship, nor to protest against them as a grievance.

But now for the present state of English Law:—I say seriously Mr. Gladstone's accusation of us avails quite as much against Blackstone's four volumes, against laws in general, against the social contract, as against the Pope. What the Pope has said, I will show presently: first let us see what the statute book has to tell us about the present state of English liberty of speech, of the press, and of worship.

First, as to public speaking and meetings :—do we allow of seditious language, or of insult to the sovereign, or his representatives? Blackstone says, that a misprision is committed against him by speaking or writing against him, cursing or wishing him ill, giving out scandalous stories concerning him, or doing anything that may tend to lessen him in the esteem of his subjects, may weaken his government, or may raise jealousies between him and his people." Also he says, that "threatening and reproachful words to any judge sitting in the Courts" involve "a high misprision, and have been punished with large fines, imprisonment, and corporal punishment." And we may recollect quite lately the judges of the Queen's Bench prohibited public meetings and speeches which had for their object the issue of a case then proceeding in Court.

Then, again, as to the Press, there are two modes of bridling it, one before the printed matter is published, the other after. The former is the method of censorship, the latter that of the law of libel. Each is a restriction on the liberty of the Press. We prefer the latter. I never heard it said that the law of libel was of a mild character; and I never heard that the Pope, in any Brief or Rescript, had insisted on a censorship.

Lastly, liberty of worship: as to the English restriction of it, we have had a notable example of it in the last session of Parliament, and we shall have still more edifying illustrations of it in the next, though certainly not from Mr. Gladstone. The ritualistic > party, in the free exercise of their rights, under the shelter of the Anglican rubrics, of certain of the Anglican offices, of the teaching of their great divines, and of their conscientious interpretation of the Thirty-nine Articles have, at their own expense, built churches for worship after their own way; and, on the other hand, Parliament and the newspapers are attempting to put them down, not so much because they are acting against the tradition and the law of the Establishment, but because of the national dislike and dread of the principles and doctrines which their worship embodies.

When Mr. Gladstone has a right to say broadly, by reason of these restrictions, that British law and the British people condemn the maintainers of liberty of conscience, of the press, and of worship, in toto, then may he say so of the Encyclical, on account of those words which to him have so frightful a meaning.

But now let us see, on the other hand, what the proposition really is, the condemnation of which leads him to say, that the Pope has unrestrictedly "condemned those who maintain the liberty of the Press, the liberty of conscience and of worship, and the liberty of speech," p. 16, —has "condemned free speech, free writing, and a free press," p. 42. The condemned proposition speaks as follows :—

"Liberty of conscience and worship, is the inherent right of all men. 2. It ought to be proclaimed in every rightly constituted society. 3. It is a right to all sorts of liberty (omnimodam libertatem) such, that it ought not to be restrained by any authority, ecclesiastical or civil, as far as public speaking, printing, or any other public manifestation of opinions is concerned."

Now, is there any government on earth that could stand the strain of such a doctrine as this? It starts by taking for granted that there are certain Rights of man; Mr. Gladstone so considers, I believe; but other deep thinkers of the day are quite of another opinion; however, if the doctrine of the proposition is true, then the right of conscience, of which it speaks, being inherent in man, is of universal force—that is, all over the world—also, says the proposition, it is a right which must be recognized by all rightly constituted governments. Lastly, what is the right of conscience thus inherent in our nature, thus necessary for all states? The proposition tells us. It is the liberty of every one to give public utterance, in every possible shape, by every possible channel, without any let or hindrance from God or man, to all his notions whatsoever.2

"[b]Which of the two in this matter is peremptory and sweeping in his utterance, the author of this thesis himself, or the Pope who has condemned what the other has uttered? Which of the two is it who would force upon the world a universal? All that the Pope has done is to deny a universal, and what a universal! a universal liberty to all men to say out whatever doctrines they may hold by preaching, or by the press, uncurbed by church or civil power. Does not this bear out what I said in the foregoing section of the sense in which Pope Gregory denied a "liberty of conscience "? It is a liberty of self-will. What if a man's conscience embraces the duty of regicide? or infanticide? or free love?[/b] You may say that in England the good sense of the nation would stifle and extinguish such atrocities. True, but the proposition says that it is the very right of every one, by nature, in every well constituted society. If so, why have we gagged the Press in Ireland on the ground of its being seditious? Why is not India brought within the British constitution? It seems a light epithet for the Pope to use, when he calls such a doctrine of conscience deliramenlum: of all conceivable absurdities it is the wildest and most stupid. Has Mr. Gladstone really no better complaint to make against the Pope's condemnations than this? .
Reply
#29
(02-02-2012, 09:11 PM)JayneK Wrote:
(02-02-2012, 08:20 PM)TrentCath Wrote: A) Lets not elevate the encyclopedia to being part of the magisterium

Obviously the encyclopedia is not part of the Magisterium, but it is written by expert who is aware of a vast body of information on the subject rather than the few passages taken out of context presented in this thread.  He seems more likely to know what the Church teaches than I could from reading a few encyclical quotes.

No, I am afraid the popes more likely know what is being taught, as for that matter do Cardinal Ottaviani and Archbishop Lefebvre. My point is simply that the quote does not in fact support religious liberty but does on the face of it appear to support some novel ideas, I am not going to get bogged down on it because seeing as it doesnt support religious liberty its not an issue.
Reply
#30
(02-02-2012, 09:34 PM)Someone1776 Wrote: Here is how Blessed John Henry Newman explained the Syllabus of Errors' condemnation of religious liberty. 

Quote:But I go further:—in fact the Pope has not said on this subject of conscience (for that is the main subject in question) what Mr. Gladstone makes him say. On this point I desiderate that fairness in his Pamphlet which we have a right to expect from him; and in truth his unfairness is wonderful. He says, pp. 15, 16, that the Holy See has " condemned" the maintainers of "the Liberty of the Press, of conscience, and of worship." Again, that the "Pontiff has condemned free speech, free writing, a free press, toleration of non-conformity, liberty of conscience," p. 42. Now, is not this accusation of a very wholesale character? Who would not understand it to mean that the Pope had pronounced a universal anathema against all these liberties in toto, and that English law, on the contrary, allowed those liberties in toto, which the Pope had condemned? But the Pope has done no such thing. The real question is, in what respect, in what measure, has he spoken against liberty :. the grant of liberty admits of degrees. Blackstone is careful to show how much more liberty the law allowed to the subject in his day, how much less severe it was in its safeguards against abuse, than it had used to be; but he never pretends that it is conceivable that liberty should have no boundary at all. The very idea of political society is based upon the principle that each member of it gives up a portion of his natural liberty for advantages which are greater than that liberty; and the question is, whether the Pope, in any act of his which touches us Catholics, in any ecclesiastical or theological' statement of his, has propounded any principle, doctrine, or view, which is not carried out in fact at this time in British courts of law, and would not be conceded by Blackstone. I repeat, the very notion of human society is a relinquishment, to a certain point, of the liberty of its members individually, for the sake of a common security. Would it be fair on that account to say that the British Constitution condemns all liberty of conscience in word and in deed?

We Catholics, on our part, are denied liberty of our religion by English law in various ways, but we do not complain, because a limit must be put to even innocent liberties, and we acquiesce in it for the social compensations which we gain on the whole. Our school boys cannot play cricket on Sunday, not even in country places, for fear of being taken before a magistrate and fined. In Scotland we cannot play music on. Sundays. Here we cannot sound a bell for church. I have had before now a lawyer's authority for saying that a religious procession is illegal even within our own premises. Till the last year or two we could not call our Bishops by the titles which our Religion gave them. A mandate from the Home Secretary obliged us to put off our cassocks when we went out of doors. We are forced to pay rates for the establishment of secular schools which we cannot use, and then we have to find means over again for building schools of our own. Why is not all this as much an outrage on our conscience as the prohibition upon Protestants at Home, Naples, and Malaga, before the late political changes—{not, to hold their services in a private house, or in the ambassador's, or outside the walls),—but to flaunt them in public and thereby to irritate the natives? Mr. Gladstone seems to think it is monstrous for the Holy See to sanction such a prohibition. If so, may we not call upon him to gain for us in Birmingham "the free exercise of our religion," in making a circuit of the streets in our vestments, and chanting the " Pange Lingua," and the protection of the police against the mob which would be sure to gather round us—particularly since we are English born, whereas the Protestants at Malaga or Naples were foreigners.1 But we have the good sense neither to feel such disabilities a hardship, nor to protest against them as a grievance.

But now for the present state of English Law:—I say seriously Mr. Gladstone's accusation of us avails quite as much against Blackstone's four volumes, against laws in general, against the social contract, as against the Pope. What the Pope has said, I will show presently: first let us see what the statute book has to tell us about the present state of English liberty of speech, of the press, and of worship.

First, as to public speaking and meetings :—do we allow of seditious language, or of insult to the sovereign, or his representatives? Blackstone says, that a misprision is committed against him by speaking or writing against him, cursing or wishing him ill, giving out scandalous stories concerning him, or doing anything that may tend to lessen him in the esteem of his subjects, may weaken his government, or may raise jealousies between him and his people." Also he says, that "threatening and reproachful words to any judge sitting in the Courts" involve "a high misprision, and have been punished with large fines, imprisonment, and corporal punishment." And we may recollect quite lately the judges of the Queen's Bench prohibited public meetings and speeches which had for their object the issue of a case then proceeding in Court.

Then, again, as to the Press, there are two modes of bridling it, one before the printed matter is published, the other after. The former is the method of censorship, the latter that of the law of libel. Each is a restriction on the liberty of the Press. We prefer the latter. I never heard it said that the law of libel was of a mild character; and I never heard that the Pope, in any Brief or Rescript, had insisted on a censorship.

Lastly, liberty of worship: as to the English restriction of it, we have had a notable example of it in the last session of Parliament, and we shall have still more edifying illustrations of it in the next, though certainly not from Mr. Gladstone. The ritualistic > party, in the free exercise of their rights, under the shelter of the Anglican rubrics, of certain of the Anglican offices, of the teaching of their great divines, and of their conscientious interpretation of the Thirty-nine Articles have, at their own expense, built churches for worship after their own way; and, on the other hand, Parliament and the newspapers are attempting to put them down, not so much because they are acting against the tradition and the law of the Establishment, but because of the national dislike and dread of the principles and doctrines which their worship embodies.

When Mr. Gladstone has a right to say broadly, by reason of these restrictions, that British law and the British people condemn the maintainers of liberty of conscience, of the press, and of worship, in toto, then may he say so of the Encyclical, on account of those words which to him have so frightful a meaning.

But now let us see, on the other hand, what the proposition really is, the condemnation of which leads him to say, that the Pope has unrestrictedly "condemned those who maintain the liberty of the Press, the liberty of conscience and of worship, and the liberty of speech," p. 16, —has "condemned free speech, free writing, and a free press," p. 42. The condemned proposition speaks as follows :—

"Liberty of conscience and worship, is the inherent right of all men. 2. It ought to be proclaimed in every rightly constituted society. 3. It is a right to all sorts of liberty (omnimodam libertatem) such, that it ought not to be restrained by any authority, ecclesiastical or civil, as far as public speaking, printing, or any other public manifestation of opinions is concerned."

Now, is there any government on earth that could stand the strain of such a doctrine as this? It starts by taking for granted that there are certain Rights of man; Mr. Gladstone so considers, I believe; but other deep thinkers of the day are quite of another opinion; however, if the doctrine of the proposition is true, then the right of conscience, of which it speaks, being inherent in man, is of universal force—that is, all over the world—also, says the proposition, it is a right which must be recognized by all rightly constituted governments. Lastly, what is the right of conscience thus inherent in our nature, thus necessary for all states? The proposition tells us. It is the liberty of every one to give public utterance, in every possible shape, by every possible channel, without any let or hindrance from God or man, to all his notions whatsoever.2

"[b]Which of the two in this matter is peremptory and sweeping in his utterance, the author of this thesis himself, or the Pope who has condemned what the other has uttered? Which of the two is it who would force upon the world a universal? All that the Pope has done is to deny a universal, and what a universal! a universal liberty to all men to say out whatever doctrines they may hold by preaching, or by the press, uncurbed by church or civil power. Does not this bear out what I said in the foregoing section of the sense in which Pope Gregory denied a "liberty of conscience "? It is a liberty of self-will. What if a man's conscience embraces the duty of regicide? or infanticide? or free love?[/b] You may say that in England the good sense of the nation would stifle and extinguish such atrocities. True, but the proposition says that it is the very right of every one, by nature, in every well constituted society. If so, why have we gagged the Press in Ireland on the ground of its being seditious? Why is not India brought within the British constitution? It seems a light epithet for the Pope to use, when he calls such a doctrine of conscience deliramenlum: of all conceivable absurdities it is the wildest and most stupid. Has Mr. Gladstone really no better complaint to make against the Pope's condemnations than this? .

Actually Bl Cardinal Newman is talking about the popes condemnation of all the various liberties not just religious liberty, again your quote show no support whatsoever for religious liberty, merely pragmatic religious tolerance, again something very different from liberty.

You would do well to simply accept the clear papal teaching on this matter rather than finding equivocal statements which do no more than support religious tolerance in an attempt to show they support religious liberty.
Reply




Users browsing this thread: 1 Guest(s)