Dealing with apparent contradictions in Church teaching
#1
As Catholics, our starting assumption is that Church teaching is not in error.  This is our default position.  We have a duty, if we are capable of it, to reconcile apparent contradictions in Church teaching rather than claim that a teaching is in error. These are common explanations to consider:

Quotes out of context.
The meaning of one or more passages has been misrepresented by taking it out of context to create a false illusion of contradiction.

Lack of significant difference.
A difference is not necessarily a contradiction. For example,  compare the statements "Heresy and schism are closely related sins." and "Schism and heresy are closely related sins."  The difference in word order does not mean that these statements contradict each other or that one is in error.

Shift in emphasis.
Different truths may be emphasized, depending on the audience or circumstances.  St. Augustine, writing against the errors Pelagians, makes different points than when he is writing against Donatists.  These differences are not contradictions. 

Contingent vs. timeless truths.
Some Church teaching is contingent on specific situations and should not be understood as a timeless truth.  There is nothing wrong with contingent teachings being different from each other when they are dealing with different situations.

Legitimate development of doctrine.
Sometimes new terminology or conceptual frameworks are introduced which assist the Church in her mission of teaching the truth.  These changes may produce differences which might be perceived by some as contradictions, but they are not.

Some people seem to think that any difference constitutes a contradiction.  I hope the above points show that this is not true.  A difference between two Church teachings is not necessarily a contradiction between them.  However, at times one needs a fairly strong background in theology and/or history to understand why two teachings are different.  People who do not have this background should go to the default position - Church teaching is not in error.  They should assume their lack of knowledge is the reason for their perception of a contradiction.

It is theoretically possible for a non-infallible Church teaching to be in error.  But very few people know enough to eliminate all the other possible explanations for a difference between two Church teachings and be left with the conclusion that one of them is in error. 
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#2
(08-16-2012, 09:07 PM)JayneK Wrote: It is theoretically possible for a non-infallible Church teaching to be in error.  But very few people know enough to eliminate all the other possible explanations for a difference between two Church teachings and be left with the conclusion that one of them is in error. 

This might be true in a Socratic sense, if you will, but I think it is too strong for the way we live our daily lives.  Of course, I would probably also take issue with calling some of the things you have in mind "Church teachings."

The rest of your post I basically agree with.
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#3
(08-16-2012, 09:07 PM)JayneK Wrote: As Catholics, our starting assumption is that Church teaching is not in error.  This is our default position.  We have a duty, if we are capable of it, to reconcile apparent contradictions in Church teaching rather than claim that a teaching is in error. These are common explanations to consider:

Quotes out of context.
The meaning of one or more passages has been misrepresented by taking it out of context to create a false illusion of contradiction.

Lack of significant difference.
A difference is not necessarily a contradiction. For example,  compare the statements "Heresy and schism are closely related sins." and "Schism and heresy are closely related sins."  The difference in word order does not mean that these statements contradict each other or that one is in error.

Shift in emphasis.
Different truths may be emphasized, depending on the audience or circumstances.  St. Augustine, writing against the errors Pelagians, makes different points than when he is writing against Donatists.  These differences are not contradictions. 

Contingent vs. timeless truths.
Some Church teaching is contingent on specific situations and should not be understood as a timeless truth.  There is nothing wrong with contingent teachings being different from each other when they are dealing with different situations.

Legitimate development of doctrine.
Sometimes new terminology or conceptual frameworks are introduced which assist the Church in her mission of teaching the truth.  These changes may produce differences which might be perceived by some as contradictions, but they are not.

Some people seem to think that any difference constitutes a contradiction.  I hope the above points show that this is not true.  A difference between two Church teachings is not necessarily a contradiction between them.  However, at times one needs a fairly strong background in theology and/or history to understand why two teachings are different.  People who do not have this background should go to the default position - Church teaching is not in error.  They should assume their lack of knowledge is the reason for their perception of a contradiction.

It is theoretically possible for a non-infallible Church teaching to be in error.  But very few people know enough to eliminate all the other possible explanations for a difference between two Church teachings and be left with the conclusion that one of them is in error. 

I know I said I wouldn't reply to you but:

a) I do not intend to behave, even if provoked, as I did on the other thread and I unreservedly apologise for any and all wrong things I did
b) The seriousness of the errors and thus of the scandal caused by some of this post impels me to address it

You assert that anyone who does not have a fairly strong background in theology and/or history should presume church teaching is not in error and that their lack of knowledge is the reason for their perception of a contradiction, this statement is problematic for several reasons:

i) it is vague what is a 'fairly strong background...' who determines this? How do people assess whether they have this? Ultimately it becomes a subjective measure and means that anyone could claim that the reason they perceive an error is that they don't have a strong enough background and there would be no way of defending against this claim
ii) this claim leads to outcomes that are repugnant to reason. For example if the pope got up tommorow and said 'Jesus Christ is no longer God' your rules would require that person unless they had a strong background in theology or history to simply presume that actually the pope was somehow right. This is self evidently repugnant to reason as the person in question knows that the pope cannot possibly be right.  I admit this is reductio ad absurdam but it is fair, why? There are certain elements of our faith which we are all bound to know and there are certain statements which are so brash even the smallest child who has been properly catechised could know they are contrary to the faith. But if we allow this, we admit that your rule is not absolute and that in fact in some cases it is wrong and leads to outcomes that are repugnant to reason. It then simply becomes a matter of degree and not of kind when it comes to establishing which errors are so brash that they in fact constitute an error that anyone can make a judgment on and in fact various errors will become obvious to those with varying levels of education, even if they don''t have a 'strong theological and historical background'.  For an example of this see Pope John Paul II saying 'May St John the Baptist protect Islam', even a child on the street who has been catechised knows this statement is scandalous. Slightly more education would be required to know that the statement that 'all the baptised are by virtue of their baptism in some form of communion with The Catholic Church and have access to the community of salvation', a simple perusal of theological manuals or papal encyclicals will show that this in fact not the case. A degree more education is required to see that the statement 'the old covenant which was never revoked' is false, for example if someone had read what pope benedict XIV or the council of florence stated on the matter.

As to your post as a whole:
a) you give several general and vague explanations for contradictions but do not actually apply them to the cases at hand
b)it is contrary to the teaching of theologians which teach that it is in fact possible to hold in error non infallible teachings merely by consulting with experts. Now it is clear that consulting a theological manual, if it speaks clearly on the matter could well count as this.
c) it is contrary to the teaching of theologians which teach, inter alia,  that if a pope or bishop were to deny or attack certain parts of the faith which all are bound to know, we can and must resist them, This means:
i) that there are some parts of the faith which are all bound to know
ii) that there are some parts of the faith which all can potentially and reasonably perceive contradictions of
d) It is unconvincing as rather than address the seriously problematic statements made by popes you have made vague general statements, backed by no sources or citations, that is you are speaking on your own authority with no support from the authority of others.
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#4
I forgot to add that it is also problematic because you seem to be presuming that anything a pope teaches becomes church teaching, this is contrary to what is, at least, the more probable opinion which states that popes can in fact make serious errors when teaching things and those things in question must be rejected and the pope resisted.

Quote:
“If the pope gives an order contrary to right customs, he should not be obeyed; if he attempts to do something manifestly opposed to justice and the common good, it will be lawful to resist him; if he attacks by force, by force he can be repelled, with a moderation appropriate to a just defence.”
Suarez (De Fide, Disp. X, Sec. VI, N. 16)

Quote: “According to natural law, violence may lawfully be opposed by violence. Now, through the acts permitted and the orders of the kind under discussion, the Pope does commit violence, because he is acting contrary to what is lawful. It therefore follows that it is lawful to oppose him publicly. Cajetan draws attention to the fact that this should not be interpreted as meaning that anybody whosoever can judge the Pope, or assume authority over him, but rather that it is lawful to defend oneself even against him. Every person, in fact, has the right to oppose an unjust action in order to prevent, if he is able, its being carried out, and thus he defends himself.
Francisco de Vitoria, Obras, pp. 486-7

Quote:  It is imperative to resist a pope who is openly destroying the Church
Cajetan, De Comparata Auctoritate Papae et Concilio

Quote:“Just as it is lawful to resist the pope that attacks the body, it is also lawful to resist the one who attacks souls or who disturbs civil order, or, above all, who attempts to destroy the Church. I say that it is lawful to resist him by not doing what he orders and preventing his will from being executed.
St Robert Bellarmine, De Romano Pontifice, Lib. II, Ch. 29

Quote:  What should be done in cases where the pope destroys the Church by his evil actions?... What should be done if the pope wishes unreasonably to abolish the laws of church or state? He would certainly be in sin, and it would be unlawful to allow him to act in such a fashion, and likewise to obey him in matters which are evil; on the contrary, there is a duty to oppose him while administering a courteous rebuke.

Thus, were he to wish to distribute the Church's wealth, or Peter's Patrimony among his own relatives; were he to wish to destroy the church or to commit an act of similar magnitude, there would be a duty to prevent him, and likewise an obligation to oppose him and resist him. The reason being that he does not possess power in order to destroy, and thus it follows that if he is so doing it is lawful to oppose him.

It is clear from the preceding that, if the pope by his commands, orders or by his actions is destroying the church, he may be resisted and the fulfilment of his commands prevented. The right of open resistance to prelates’ abuse of authority stems also from natural law.
Sylvester Prieras Dialogus de Potestate Papae

Indeed Francisco de Vitoria has an even more explicit quote saying

Quote:Caietano, in the same work defending the superiority of the Pope over the Council, says in chap. 27: ‘Therefore, a Pope must be resisted who publicly destroys the Church, for example, by refusing to give ecclesiastical benefits except for money or in exchange for services; and with all obedience and respect, the possession of such benefits must be denied to those who bought them.’

And Silvestre (Prierias), in the entry Pope, § 4, asks: ‘What should be done when the Pope, because of his bad customs, destroys the Church?’ And in §15: ‘What should be done if the Pope wanted, without reason, to abrogate Positive Law?’ To which he answers: ‘He would certainly sin; he should neither be permitted to act in such fashion nor should he be obeyed in what was evil; but he should be resisted with a courteous reprehension.’

Consequently, if he wished to give away the whole treasure of the Church or the patrimony of St. Peter to his relatives, if he wanted to destroy the Church or the like, he should not be permitted to act in that fashion, but one would be obliged to resist him. The reason for this is that he does not have the power to destroy; therefore, if there is evidence that he is doing it, it is licit to resist him.

The result of all this is that if the Pope destroys the Church by his orders and acts, he can be resisted and the execution of his mandates prevented. ...

Second proof of the thesis: By Natural Law it is licit to repel violence with violence. Now then, with such orders and dispensations the Pope exerts violence, since he acts against the Law, as we have proven. Therefore, it is licit to resist him.

As Caietano observes, we do not affirm all this in the sense that someone could have competence to judge the Pope or have authority over him, but meaning that it is licit to defend oneself. Indeed, anyone has the right to resist an unjust act, to try to prevent it and to defend himself.
Obras de Francisco de Vitoria, Madrid: BAC, 1960, pp. 486-487

Quote:What is the use of forming impossible cases? One can find plenty of them in books of casuistry, with the answers attached in respect to them. In an actual case, a Catholic would, of course, not act simply on his own judgment; at the same time, there are supposable cases in which he would be obliged to go by it solely—viz., when his conscience could not be reconciled to any of the courses of action proposed to him by others.

In support of what I have been saying, I refer to one or two weighty authorities:—

Cardinal Turrecremata says, "Although it clearly follows from the circumstance that the Pope can err at times, and command things which must not be done, that we are not to be simply obedient to him in all things, that does not show that he must not be obeyed by all when his commands are good. To know in what cases he is to be obeyed and in what not ... it is said in the Acts of the Apostles, 'One ought to obey God rather than man:' therefore, were the Pope to command anything against Holy Scripture, or the articles of faith, or the truth of the Sacraments, or the commands of the natural or divine law, he ought not to be obeyed, but in such commands is to be passed over (despiciendus)."—Summ. de Eccl., pp. 47, 48.

Bellarmine, speaking of resisting the Pope, says, {243} "In order to resist and defend oneself no authority is required ... Therefore, as it is lawful to resist the Pope, if he assaulted a man's person, so it is lawful to resist him, if he assaulted souls, or troubled the state (turbanti rempublicam), and much more if he strove to destroy the Church. It is lawful, I say, to resist him, by not doing what he commands, and hindering the execution of his will."—De Rom. Pont., ii. 29.

Archbishop Kenrick says, "His power was given for edification, not for destruction. If he uses it from the love of domination (quod absit) scarcely will he meet with obedient populations."—Theolog. Moral., t. i. p. 158.

When, then, Mr. Gladstone asks Catholics how they can obey the Queen and yet obey the Pope, since it may happen that the commands of the two authorities may clash, I answer, that it is my rule, both to obey the one and to obey the other, but that there is no rule in this world without exceptions, and if either the Pope or the Queen demanded of me an "Absolute Obedience," he or she would be transgressing the laws of human society. I give an absolute obedience to neither. Further, if ever this double allegiance pulled me in contrary ways, which in this age of the world I think it never will, then I should decide according to the particular case, which is beyond all rule, and must be decided on its own merits. I should look to see what theologians could do for me, what the Bishops and clergy around me, what my confessor; what friends whom I revered: and if, after all, I could not take their view of {244} the matter, then I must rule myself by my own judgment and my own conscience. But all this is hypothetical and unreal.

Here, of course, it will be objected to me, that I am, after all, having recourse to the Protestant doctrine of Private Judgment; not so; it is the Protestant doctrine that Private Judgment is our ordinary guide in religious matters, but I use it, in the case in question, in very extraordinary and rare, nay, impossible emergencies. Do not the highest Tories thus defend the substitution of William for James II.? It is a great mistake to suppose our state in the Catholic Church is so entirely subjected to rule and system, that we are never thrown upon what is called by divines "the Providence of God." The teaching and assistance of the Church does not supply all conceivable needs, but those which are ordinary; thus, for instance, the sacraments are necessary for dying in the grace of God and hope of heaven, yet, when they cannot be got, acts of faith, hope, and contrition, with the desire for those aids which the dying man has not, will convey in substance what those aids ordinarily convey. And so a Catechumen, not yet baptized, may be saved by his purpose and preparation to receive the rite. And so, again, though "Out of the Church there is no salvation," this does not hold in the case of good men who are in invincible ignorance. And so it is also in the case of our ordinations; Chillingworth and Macau1ay say that it is morally impossible that we should have kept up for 1800 years an Apostolical succession of ministers without some breaks in the chain; and we in answer say that, however true this {245} may be humanly speaking, there has been a special Providence over the Church to secure it. Once more, how else could private Catholics save their souls when there was a Pope and Anti-popes, each severally claiming their allegiance?
Bl Cardinal Newman, letter to the duke of Norfolk
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#5
(08-16-2012, 11:21 PM)TrentCath Wrote: a) I do not intend to behave, even if provoked, as I did on the other thread and I unreservedly apologise for any and all wrong things I did

I didn't want to say anything before, but really, I am so glad to see this.  Bravo, TC!

Quote:c) it is contrary to the teaching of theologians which teach, inter alia,  that if a pope or bishop were to deny or attack certain parts of the faith which all are bound to know, we can and must resist them, This means:
i) that there are some parts of the faith which are all bound to know
ii) that there are some parts of the faith which all can potentially and reasonably perceive contradictions of

Also, in my mind these are all excellent points.  Bravo again!
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#6
Lastly it is problematic because the underlying principle beneath it, which seems to be one must follow the more probable teaching, is contrary to the teachings of probablism (used by St Alphonsus Ligouri and approved by the church) which teaches:

Quote: The cases which are
constantly submitted to the decision of courts of law, but
which also belong to morality, illustrate the familiar truth that
opinion and not certainty is very often alone attainable in the
field of conduct. But if this be the case, what is a conscientious
man to do ? He finds himself in a difficulty ; what the right
thing to do under the circumstances may be is not clear. A
young man has promised to marry a girl somewhat his inferior
in social position ; they are both satisfied that the union would
be a happy one for both, but the young man's parents will not
hear of the thing, and strictly forbid him to see the girl again.
Must he obey his parents, or may he follow his inclinations
and keep his promise ? He consults those whose knowledge
and judgement he respects, and they give him contrary
decisions. He goes to recognized authorities on morals, and
finds the same difference of opinion.
This example is but a type of innumerable questions which
constantly arise in everyday life. Is it possible to lay down
any universal principle for the solution of such doubtful cases,
so as to be able to act with a certain conscience ?
Catholic theologians answer this question in the affirmative,
but they are not agreed as to what the principle is. A probabiliorist
would tell the young man that he must obey his
parents and break off the engagement unless the opinion that
he may marry the girl in spite of the prohibition is distinctly more probable than the opposite. An equiprobabilist would
say that he may marry the girl if the weight of opinion is fairly
equal on either side. A probabilist would maintain that he
may marry her if there is a solidly probable opinion which
favours that course. The terms are technical, and their
meaning should be carefully studied.
An opinion, as we have already gathered from St Thomas,
is an adhesion of the mind to one proposition, but with a
consciousness that the opposite may be true.
A probable opinion is one which rests on good and solid
grounds, such as would incline a man of prudence and judgement
to embrace it. If the intrinsic reasons of the opinion are
the grounds for embracing it, we have an intrinsic probability ;
if authority is the ground, we have an extrinsic probability. A more probable opinion is one which rests on weightier
reasons than the opposite, but which leaves the opposite still
probable.
A very probable opinion rests on such solid grounds that
the opposite is not considered solidly probable.
A morally certain opinion excludes even slight probability
in the opposite ; it is an adhesion of the mind to a truth without
any fear of mistake.
2. In this difficult question, the Catholic Church so far has
been content to condemn extreme views, and allows her
children to follow any of the moderate systems mentioned
above. Alexander VIII1 condemned rigorism, which required
direct moral certainty in all cases about the lawfulness of an
action, and denied that it is ever lawful to follow' an opinion
which is very probable among several. Laxism was condemned
by Innocent XI, since it taught that one might lawfully
act on a slight probability.
2 The systems which are known
as Probabiliorism, Equiprobabilism, and Probabilism all have
their adherents ; the Catholic moralist is free to follow whichever
he wishes.
To us it seems that probabilism is the true system, and if it
be rightly understood, as it is taught by its moderate supporters,
and not as it is misinterpreted by its opponents, we are convinced
that it will recommend itself to practical common sense.
Its maxim may be formulated thus: When there is only
question of committing sin or not, it is lawful to follow a
solidly probable opinion, even though the opposite may be
more probable.
 
The wording of the formula should be carefully weighed. The words " when there is only question of committing sin or not limit the application of the principle to cases where
the only question is whether by following such a course sin will be committed because a certain law, human or divine, will
be broken. Probabilism, then, cannot be applied to cases
where the validity of an act is in question, where some end
must be obtained, or where there is question of the certain
right of some other person which must be respected. In all
these cases we are bound to safeguard the end by taking means
that are sure and not merely probable. These are not so
many exceptions to the use of probabilism; there is a certain
obligation to use secure means to obtain the end in view in
such cases, and so there can be no question as to whether
probabilism is applicable or not. This will explain why
Innocent XI condemned a proposition which asserted that it
is not unlawful for a minister of the sacraments to follow a
probable opinion about their validity when administering
them; and another, which taught that a judge might use
probabilism in giving sentence in a court of law ; and a third,
which excused an infidel who followed a probable opinion and
remained in infidelity.

In all these cases there is not merely
question of sin, but the certain rights of others are at stake,
or there is question of an end which cannot lawfully be exposed
to risk.
Again, the words " it is lawful to follow a solidly probable
opinion " should be noted. It is not a question as to what
is more perfect, what the noble and generous thing to do may
be. The rule merely asserts that there is no obligation under
pain of sin to follow the more perfect course, if in the case
there be one.
Finally, the words are added " even though the opposite
may be more probable." For the greater probability of the
other view does not make it certain, nor is the supposed greater
probability a sure guarantee that the more probable view is
the more true. It very frequently happens that an opinion
which is considered more probable at one time is thought less
probable or altogether improbable at another. Moreover,
degrees of probability are very difficult to determine. What
seems more probable to one theologian seems less so to
another, or even to the same at a different time.
Manual of Moral Theology for English speaking countries

Now doubting non infallible truths not out of malice but out of genuine confusion and good will does not endanger ones salvation it does not 'endanger an end which cannot lawfully be put at risk' does it endanger someone elses rights? It certainly will not lead to disobedience against the pope, as the person is in good faith and as the pope does not have an absolute right to our obedience and in certain cases it is lawful not to obey him it cannot be absolutely claimed it endangers his lawful rights. One can then use the tenets of probabilism at the very least for the more obvious contradictions issued by the popes, especially as many of these are not even binding and were for example speeches or letters etc..

It is of course true that for outright disobedience one should use tutiorism, for example dumping Vatican 2 or most of it, but even here there are certain errors which are so manifest anyone can see them. It is perfectly possible for an ordinary lay person to form moral certainty on such matters.

Ultimately the presumption in your post undermines the very basis of all moral theology, a person in order to come to a certain conscience would either have to have certain qualities (an outcome which is repugnant to reason because they would be forever paralysed from doing anything, as a certain conscience is required for many actions) or would simply have to presume, even if it was repugnant to reason and it was not required, that such and such teaching was correct. They would have to do this even if probable, more probable or even certain arguments could be made, that in fact such and such teaching was not correct, merely because they did not have certain qualities. This seems repugnant to reason as it would in fact require them to act against their conscience and therefore sin.
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#7
(08-16-2012, 09:07 PM)JayneK Wrote: As Catholics, our starting assumption is that Church teaching is not in error.  This is our default position.  We have a duty, if we are capable of it, to reconcile apparent contradictions in Church teaching rather than claim that a teaching is in error. These are common explanations to consider:

Quotes out of context.
The meaning of one or more passages has been misrepresented by taking it out of context to create a false illusion of contradiction.

Lack of significant difference.
A difference is not necessarily a contradiction. For example,  compare the statements "Heresy and schism are closely related sins." and "Schism and heresy are closely related sins."  The difference in word order does not mean that these statements contradict each other or that one is in error.

Shift in emphasis.
Different truths may be emphasized, depending on the audience or circumstances.  St. Augustine, writing against the errors Pelagians, makes different points than when he is writing against Donatists.  These differences are not contradictions. 

Contingent vs. timeless truths.
Some Church teaching is contingent on specific situations and should not be understood as a timeless truth.  There is nothing wrong with contingent teachings being different from each other when they are dealing with different situations.

Legitimate development of doctrine.
Sometimes new terminology or conceptual frameworks are introduced which assist the Church in her mission of teaching the truth.  These changes may produce differences which might be perceived by some as contradictions, but they are not.

Some people seem to think that any difference constitutes a contradiction.  I hope the above points show that this is not true.  A difference between two Church teachings is not necessarily a contradiction between them.  However, at times one needs a fairly strong background in theology and/or history to understand why two teachings are different.  People who do not have this background should go to the default position - Church teaching is not in error.  They should assume their lack of knowledge is the reason for their perception of a contradiction.

It is theoretically possible for a non-infallible Church teaching to be in error.  But very few people know enough to eliminate all the other possible explanations for a difference between two Church teachings and be left with the conclusion that one of them is in error. 

The problem is with people who claim contradiction but then refuse to take that to its logical conclusion which is that the Church has defected.  That's simply cognitive dissonance mixed with some plain old stupidity.

Failing that, one could claim that any apparent contradictions of Vat II and Conciliar popes are just apparent, not actual.  Which means the neo-Cats are right and trads are wrong.

In any event, there's a lot of copying and pasting being done to defend indefensible positions.  It's pathetic really.
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#8
(08-17-2012, 01:45 AM)DrBombay Wrote: The problem is with people who claim contradiction but then refuse to take that to its logical conclusion which is that the Church has defected.  That's simply cognitive dissonance mixed with some plain old stupidity.

Failing that, one could claim that any apparent contradictions of Vat II and Conciliar popes are just apparent, not actual.  Which means the neo-Cats are right and trads are wrong.

What say you, then? Are you a neo-Cat or a trad? Is it your job to show trads their cognitive dissonance mixed with stupidity?
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#9
(08-17-2012, 02:40 AM)Crusader_Philly Wrote:
(08-17-2012, 01:45 AM)DrBombay Wrote: The problem is with people who claim contradiction but then refuse to take that to its logical conclusion which is that the Church has defected.  That's simply cognitive dissonance mixed with some plain old stupidity.

Failing that, one could claim that any apparent contradictions of Vat II and Conciliar popes are just apparent, not actual.  Which means the neo-Cats are right and trads are wrong.

What say you, then? Are you a neo-Cat or a trad? Is it your job to show trads their cognitive dissonance mixed with stupidity?

People tend to get annoyed when their cognitive dissonance is pointed out and as such it doesn't do much good but I persevere, since that is a virtue.  I suspect that the contradictions can be reconciled and explained in a way that isn't absurd, I just haven't heard it yet.  But I hope, which is another virtue.

Have you ever spent anytime with neo-Cats?  They make me want to thrash them. Reminds me a lot of evangelicals.
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#10
(08-17-2012, 02:48 AM)DrBombay Wrote: I suspect that the contradictions can be reconciled and explained in a way that isn't absurd, I just haven't heard it yet.  But I hope, which is another virtue.

Don't "trads" hope too? You admit there are contradictions, but the only thing that differs is your approach, no?

Quote:Have you ever spent anytime with neo-Cats?  They make me want to thrash them. Reminds me a lot of evangelicals.

I have, and I know what you mean.
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