Pink vs. Rhonheimer, plus Lamont and Abp. Lefebvre, on Dignitatis Humanæ
#1
Compare Rhonheimer's Nova et Vetera article "Benedict XVI's 'Hermeneutic of Reform' and Religious Freedom" to
Rhonheimer's NV article (in which he argues for a hermeutic of discontinuity and explicitly discusses the SSPX's views) and Pink's response make the best debate on the DH issue I've seen yet.

Let me know what Rhonheimer's and/or Pink's arguments' weak points are.

Another good article: John Lamont replies to Pink in his "Catholic Teaching on Religion and the State."

"Archbishop Lefebvre Concerning Religious Liberty" from Michael Davies's Apologia pro Marcel Lefebvre is excellent, too.
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#2
Most of the links are broken, G.
More Catholic Discussion: http://thetradforum.com/

Go thy ways, old Jack;
die when thou wilt, if manhood, good manhood, be
not forgot upon the face of the earth, then am I a
shotten herring. There live not three good men
unhanged in England; and one of them is fat and
grows old: God help the while! a bad world, I say.
I would I were a weaver; I could sing psalms or any
thing. A plague of all cowards, I say still.
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#3
(09-27-2012, 11:44 PM)Mithrandylan Wrote: Most of the links are broken, G.
Sorry about that; I've corrected it.
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#4
Another good article: John Lamont replies to Pink in his "Catholic Teaching on Religion and the State."
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#5
Thanks for this Geremia. I'm currently reading the response of John Lamont. I think it's brilliant.
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#6
(09-28-2012, 02:27 AM)Geremia Wrote: Another good article: John Lamont replies to Pink in his "Catholic Teaching on Religion and the State."

Amazing find!  Thank you so much!

Correction:  Not once is "tolerance" mentioned, but the "right to practice false religion" (p. 18.) is asserted without being properly clarified ("public order" is duly covered, but whether false religious freedom can be a civil right doesn't appear to be addressed).
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#7
The Lamont article was a good read.  My own take is somewhat of a mix between his and Pink's.  I don't think Pink takes into account enough the state's general duty towards the common good the way Lamont and CCC 2109 explain it or the fact that the there is a personalist element to this topic that has also always been present. 

However, I do also think spheres of jurisdiction are important to this topic as well. Not everyone is given the authority to use all means to suppress religious error or temporal crimes.  The sphere of authority and means to be used of a parent over a child are different than the Church over a member, or than two lay adult neighbors with respect to the other, etc.  The state must also have its own limitations in these matters.

I also don't think Lamont's argument using infant baptism holds much water.  Infant baptism has never been seen to violate the truth that baptism must be come to freely (and therefore its resulting obligations are also freely accepted.).  The reason is the parent has the God-given authority to act as a proxy (the freedom is exercised by the parent--the state or Church has not been given the power to act as such a proxy on behalf of adults).  Likewise, I don't think state suppression of paganism is a problem with this approach either, since those who took this jurisdictional approach (like Suarez), generally argued that paganism was contrary to reason and justice (ie the virtue of religion) and therefore fell within the temporal power's sphere.

To me, the whole debate boils down to the following: with relation to the state's duty to suppress false religious activity, is the common good a floor or a ceiling or both for when it comes to doing so by force (I would say yes, as Pius XII in Ci Riesce says such action is subordinate to norms relating to greate good)? If it is a ceiling (or both), does the necessity that faith must be free contribute to the analysis of where that ceiling is established (ie is this freedom a greater good)? And can a violation of that ceiling be deemed an act of injustice (like a man baptizing his neighbor's child against the parent's will or personally punishing his neighbor for a temporal crime)?
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#8
(09-28-2012, 04:46 AM)TraditionalistThomas Wrote: Thanks for this Geremia. I'm currently reading the response of John Lamont. I think it's brilliant.
(09-28-2012, 01:10 PM)SouthpawLink Wrote: Amazing find!  Thank you so much!
Courtesy this post by John Lane on Bellarmine Forums, in which he offers a good criticism of Lamont..
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#9
Paul Kokoski, author of The New Evangelization: Quo Vadis? in a recent issue of Homiletic & Pastoral Review, opines on Fr. Rhonheimer's article:
Paul Kokoski Wrote:Philosopher Fr. Martin Rhonheimer, in his essay The Hermeneutic of Reform and Religious Freedom, attempts to justify this idea of separating the pastoral from the doctrinal in order to make the doctrinal subject to the pastoral. He claims, for example, there is “no opposition” between what Pope Benedict XVI coined in 2005 the “hermeneutic of discontinuity” and the “hermeneutic of continuity”. True “reform”, he says , lies “in the interplay, on different levels, between continuity and discontinuity. While admitting there is a certain and present discontinuity in regards to religious freedom, he claims that this merely serves to “bring into view a deeper and more essential continuity” that being that the first Christians “did not demand that the State support religious truth”. According to Fr. Rhonheimer’s logic, it is ultimately the State, and not the Church, that decides, by its own inner mechanisms, what constitutes for the Church a human “right” where religious liberty is concerned – religious liberty being essentially a fluctuating function of how severely the church is being persecuted at any point in history? For the complete historicist, everything is true in its own time and place but that’s all.

For Fr. Rhonheimer to conclude that Vatican II teaching is a return to the religious liberty of the early centuries of the Church in the way he does is to play on the ambiguity of the term “religious liberty.” It can mean, for example, the freedom of Catholics to practice the true Faith, as in the early centuries of the Church, or it can mean the freedom of all religions, true and false, and of all people to follow all these religions. These are two entirely different things, and playing on this double meaning is essential to the modernist argument.

Indeed, the whole idea of separating the pastoral from the doctrinal is an evolutionary concept, and quite Hegelian. In Hegelian philosophy, the two are in interplay with one another, as are continuity and rupture. This interplay is, in Hegelian terms, an opposition between thesis and antithesis, creating a new synthesis. To say that there must be both continuity and rupture is for Catholics a contradiction, but for the modernist self-evident, a new order being constantly created by the interplay between continuity and rupture. Since, for the modernist, there is no objective truth or right – there is no contradiction.

The Hegelian methods of reinterpreting, de-mything, and or of selectively eliminating Tradition which – contrary to Fr. Rhonheimer – are not supported in Gaudium et spes (22), is essentially no different than when Catholic Modernists who favor abortion, contraception, homosexuality etc. reach behind the words of the Vatican II texts to carve out their own self-serving meanings. There is a false spirit – or “hermeneutic of discontinuity” – at play in both instances. Both represent rupture not reform. This kind of intellectually dishonesty in the guise of orthodoxy is what is preventing the Church from moving forward. It is the reason why the true spirit of Vatican II has yet to emerge – except in extremely minute quarters.
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